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PUBLIC VALUES IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.t
A considerable body of recent legal scholarship has suggested that
an important role of constitutional interpretation is to articulate and
enforce "public values" for our nation.' Public values, as I am using
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to Daniel Farber, Philip Frickey, Richard Posner, Suzanna Sherry, Cass Sunstein, and
Mark Tushnet for gracious and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this Arti-
cle. Robert Schoshinski provided excellent research assistance. Dean Robert Pitofsky of
the Georgetown University Law Center provided intellectual and financial support for
this Article, for which I am also grateful.
1 I include several distinct strains of constitutional theory in my treatment of pub-
lic values scholarship. See generally Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional
Theory, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1502 (1985) (surveying the variety of anti-formalist tenden-
cies in recent constitutional theory, and concluding that most, under current social con-
ditions, are rather utopian). The term itself is associated with the "republican revival,"
in which constitutional scholars have returned to the concept of the "common good" as
an aspiration for government. See generally Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discover-
ing the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Michelman, The Supreme Court,
1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986)
[hereinafter Michelman, Traces of Self-Government]; Michelman, Politics and Values
or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487
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the term,2 are legal norms and principles that form fundamental under-
lying precepts for our polity-background norms that contribute to and
result from the moral development of our political community. Public
values appeal to conceptions of justice and the common good, not to the
desires of just one person or group. The nondiscrimination princi-
ple-people should not be penalized on the basis of their race, sex or
sexual preference, ethnic background, or parentage-is an example of a
public value. Through their power of judicial review, courts can over-
turn legislative enactments that violate our important public values
(e.g., by penalizing persons based upon their race). Even if an enact-
ment is not invalidated, the process of constitutional adjudication gener-
ates a useful dialogue about what kind of political community we want
to be. This body of scholarship remains controversial even while it be-
comes increasingly influential. The academic debate about the role of
courts in articulating and enforcing public values has generated great
intellectual excitement in constitutional scholarship.
It is anomalous that virtually none of the public values debate has
found its way into scholarship about statutory interpretation.' After all,
courts rarely strike down statutes as unconstitutional, whereas they in-
terpret statutes constantly. If courts have a role in articulating and en-
(1979); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [herein-
after Sunstein, Beyond); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]. I also include the ample
scholarship that pursues the theoretical implications of the Brown cases for our democ-
racy. See 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); 0. Fiss & D. RENDLE-
MAN, INJUNCTIONS (2d ed. 1984); Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the
Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979). Finally, I in-
clude Ronald Dworkin's scholarship, which argues that law is best seen as "integrity,"
or a coherent collection of moral guides that bind together and enrich our political
society. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SE-
RIOUSLY (1977).
2 Oddly, public values thinkers have not satisfactorily defined exactly what a
"public value" is. See Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1984) (arguing that traditional legal theorists "fail to acknowledge
that the principles we use to justify legal rules are not and cannot be based on consider-
ations completely independent of our views of the good life"). Compare Fiss, supra
note 1, at 9 (public values are "what is true, right, or just") with Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1694 (1984) (public value
is "any justification for government action that goes beyond the exercise of raw political
power"). M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 164-65 (1988), argues that there is at bottom no "content" to public
values. As Parts II and III will reveal, one can show that there is content to public
values in statutory interpretation, although many of us will disagree with the Court's
choice of values.
' The main exceptions are R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 313-
54; R. DWORKIN, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316
(1985); Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 1, at 1581-89.
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forcing public values, why should that role not inform judicial interpre-
tation of statutes? Isn't statutory interpretation potentially a richer
source of debate about public values? And given the greater variety of
cases, can statutory interpretation cases not offer us a useful laboratory
for evaluating the problems as well as the operation of public value
implementation by courts?
This Article is an effort to explore the substantial role public val-
ues already play in statutory interpretation, the potential role they
might play, and the values that ought to be considered. Part I provides
a brief intellectual history of public values in statutory interpretation
and argues that there is substantial reason to consider public values in
statutory as well as constitutional interpretation. Part II demonstrates
that public values already play an important role in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of statutes.4 Public values affect statutory inter-
pretation through clear statement rules, rebuttable policy presumptions,
and gapfilling precepts, and as important background context wherein
principles and arguments are suggested and tested. There are three
sources for public values in statutory interpretation-the Constitution,
evolving statutory policy, and common law-and I explore the values
associated with each source. From this survey of interpretive rules and
background principles, I conclude that public values are important in-
fluences in statutory interpretation. They do not control statutory
meaning when Congress has directed a fairly determinate result, but in
a broad range of statutory interpretation cases public values are critical.
Normatively, the role of public values in statutory interpretation is
appealing, because such values may foster greater coherence in our stat-
utory law and may help update statutes to reflect modern policies. Nev-
ertheless, the usefulness of the public values concept in statutory inter-
pretation is beset by three problems, which Part III explores. First,
there is sometimes a tension between public values interpretation and
legislative supremacy. In some cases, invocation of public values analy-
sis displaces a reconstructed legislative intent; this displacement strikes
many scholars as inconsistent with our representative democracy. It
does not trouble me in many cases, because I view statutory interpreta-
tion as a practical exercise that may consider the evolution of a statute
as well as its historical origins. Thus, current, rather than original, pol-
icy may be decisive, particularly when circumstances have materially
changed since the statute's enactment. On the other hand, I am troub-
" The focus of this Article is statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court in the
last decade (1978-88), with special attention to cases decided in the last three years
(1985-88). Most of the observations in this Article could be made at least as strongly
for statutory interpretation decisions of state courts of last resort as well.
19891
1010 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
led when the Court uses public values analysis to displace an apparent
legislative decision that has not been overtaken by changed circum-
stances, or where there is no strong justification for updating the appar-
ent legislative decision.
Second, the Court's use of public values analysis is not meaning-
fully consistent. The Court does not always rely on public values when
they are relevant, and it is not easy to distinguish the cases in which
public values are decisive from those in which they are simply ignored.
The Court's inconsistency suggests a deep ambivalence about the legiti-
macy of such analysis, and many of the Court's applications seem arbi-
trary. Even in the cases in which public values are treated as relevant,
there are often several potentially relevant values, each pulling the
Court in a different direction. The Court has difficulty even acknowl-
edging the existence of competing values.
The problems of legitimacy and coherence suggest a third, and
most disturbing, problem: Are the values recognized by the Court
"good" ones? Often not, I fear. The public values cases decided in the
last ten years (the primary focus of this Article) strike me as biased in
ways that are hard to justify. They display biases in favor of procedural
values over substantive values, time-tested (often obsolescent) concerns
over current ones, and the interests and agendas of politically powerful
groups over those of marginalized groups. Notwithstanding my admira-
tion for public values analysis, I think many of the decisions discussed
in Part II were wrongly decided. The Achilles' Heel of public values
analysis is that one person's (my) public value is another's (the Court's)
controversial proposition, or vice-versa. What I call the Court's "bi-
ases" would be characterized by the Court as "tradition," "judicial re-
straint," and the like. What concerns me most about public values in
statutory interpretation is that the values themselves will be unsatisfac-
tory (because they are obsolescent or class-based) and will be applied in
an arbitrary way. If that is so, public values analysis may build no
more than the facade of the grand and splendid coherence its adherents
fancy. We shall have neither "Law's Empire"' nor "Law's Republic,"6
but instead "Law's Hypocrisy."
I. A SHORT INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF PUBLIC VALUES IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Although much of the rhetoric of statutory interpretation has been
interpretivist (the role of the interpreter is to replicate the original in-
5 R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 1.
8 Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
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tent of the legislature), there is nothing new about affording public val-
ues a critical role in statutory interpretation. Blackstone's Commenta-
ries, a leading source of legal theory when the Constitution was drafted
and adopted, presented a multifaceted approach to statutory interpreta-
tion that had little to do with legislative intent; instead, Blackstone em-
phasized the fit between interpretation and the "mischief" the statute
was meant to remedy, the common law context of the statute, and the
avoidance of "unreasonable" interpretations as to collateral matters.
Indeed, for Blackstone and for nineteenth century American jurists, the
central precepts for statutory interpretation were the narrow construc-
tion of statutes in derogation of common law and the broad construction
of remedial statutes. Traditional reliance on the common law and "rea-
sonableness" as background precepts for statutory interpretation is a
direct antecedent for public values analysis today.
A related antecedent is the duster of rules developed by Anglo-
American courts as background principles of style and substance for
guiding statutory interpretation. These are colloquially known as "can-
ons" or "maxims" of statutory construction and have been prominent
features of treatises on statutory interpretation for at least a hundred
years.' The substantive canons of construction tend to operate as clear
statement rules or presumptions: Unless the legislature clearly intends
to displace an established background understanding, the court will
presume that the understanding is part of the statute. Drawing upon
Constitution-based as well as common-law-based values, the canons of
construction are a second important antecedent for modern public val-
ues analysis.'
A final antecedent is the civil law tradition, which draws princi-
See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
87-92 (1765) (outlining several general principles of statutory construction); id. at 87
(three things to be considered in interpreting "remedial" statutes: "the old law, the
mischief, and the remedy"; judges should construe the statute "as to suppress the mis-
chief and advance the remedy"); id. at 91 ("Lastly, acts of parliament that are impossi-
ble to be performed are of no validity: and if there arise out of them collaterally any
absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard
to those collateral consequences, void.").
I See, e.g., T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
225-90 (1857). More recent treatises in the same tradition include E. CRAWFORD, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES §§ 367-431 (1940); E. DRIEDGER, THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF STATUTES 81-87 (2d ed. 1983); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 45.05, 45.07, 46.01, 53.01, 54.01-.04, 55.01 (N. Singer rev.
ed. 1984). Sutherland is the leading current treatise, with a heavy emphasis on canons.
9 See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 639-96 (1987); C. Sunstein, Inter-
preting the Regulatory State (book draft Nov. 1988) for further development of this
point.
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ples and public values from statutes themselves. Although similar in
many respects to Anglo-American statutory interpretation, civil law in-
terpretation is different in its more systematic tendency to seek coher-
ence across statutes.10 Civil law judges derive principles from one stat-
ute and use those principles to make sense of the statute as a whole (the
"equity of the statute") and to relate the statute to other statutes.
Professors Roscoe Pound and James Landis (both later to serve as
Deans of the Harvard Law School) sought to import this tradition to
the United States in the early part of this century."
These three traditions-common law reasonableness, the canons of
construction, and civil law equity of the statute-were available to
American courts throughout this century and have had some influence.
But all three traditions were controversial, especially after attacks on
them by the legal realists. The realists fundamentally disagreed with
the conservative ideology underlying most of the constitutional and
common law background concepts. In addition, they found the method-
ology of the canons incoherent.' They were equally critical of ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation focused on original intent. 3 De-
spite their critique of these approaches, the realists failed to develop
their own unified theory. 4
The development of the Legal Process materials by Professors
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in the 1950s was a theoretical watershed
in statutory interpretation. The materials are a precursor to public val-
ues analysis for statutory interpretation, because they retrieve and de-
fend the three antecedents and suggest directions for overall public val-
ues analysis. Thus, while the Hart and Sacks materials paid homage to
statutory text and legislative history as important guides to statutory
10 See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 9, at 241-43 (contrasting civil and
common law views of legisprudence). See generally J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND
LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985) (analyzing the development of the "typical" civil law
system and emphasizing the common threads linking the diverse systems within the
civil law tradition); Zweigert & Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style,
44 TUL. L. REV. 704, 707-08 (1970) (discussing the tendency in civil law systems to
interpret statutes broadly to achieve the goals of code law).
"1 See Landis, Statutes as Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 214-
19 (1934); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385-89
(1908).
1" See, e.g., Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950) (listing examples where two canons express opposing views on a given point).
13 See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 881 (1930) (call-
ing the legislature's intent a "futile bit of fiction").
1' See Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Sub-
stance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 829-30 (1985) (tracing the realists' efforts to update
the old "mischief rule").
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interpretation, they also emphasized the presumptive "reasonableness"
of legislative activity and its statutory products, 5 the importance of le-
gal and societal context in yielding different interpretations over time,"e
and the usefulness of statutory purpose and the canons of construction
for interpretation.1 7 Taken as a whole, the Hart and Sacks materials
emphasize the "horizontal coherence" of statutory law-the coherence
of a present decision with other sources of law (other statutes, common
law decisions). In this way, their synthesis strikingly departs from the
Anglo-American tradition's emphasis on vertical coherence-the coher-
ence of a present decision with past antecedents (precedents, legislative
history)."'
Notwithstanding the dynamic features of their own widely influ-
ential approach to statutory interpretation, Hart and Sacks and (even
more strikingly) subsequent legal process scholars were not prepared to
accept judicially created background principles as driving forces in stat-
utory interpretation. For example, Hart and Sacks scrupulously
avoided detailed analysis of constitutional values and the gravitational
pull these values have on statutory interpretation, and only generally
endorsed the Pound-Landis thesis that statutes are themselves sources
of public values.19 While Hart and Sacks defended the canons of statu-
tory interpretation, they did so only as guideposts for the interpreter
and not as a rich source of public law background principles that might
inform statutory interpretation. 0 In short, even though Hart and Sacks
preserved the major antecedents for modern public values analysis and
were generally sympathetic to it, they were very cautious about its con-
tent. I believe they were held back from drawing out the implications of
15 See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1414-15 (tent. draft 1958).
16 See id. at 1211-18, 1379.
17 See id. at 166-67, 1148-79 (purpose of statute guides interpretation); id. at
1221, 1235-40, 1412-13 (defending canons).
18 See id. at 167 ("Doubts about the purpose of particular statutes must be re-
solved, if possible, so as to harmonize them with more general principles and policies of
law."); id. at 1241 (courts must "continue unremittingly the effort to discern and artic-
ulate principles" to help rationalize statutory law). For elaboration of the vertical/
horizontal distinction, see Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 67, 116, 122-24 (1988).
19 Given the comprehensive nature of the legal process materials, its omissions are
striking-little or no treatment of the rule that statutes should be interpreted to avoid
constitutional problems, of the federalism-based or separation-of-powers presumptions,
or of the influence of international law on statutory interpretation. The materials men-
tion the Pound-Landis thesis favorably, see H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 15, at
486, 491, but do not summarize the argument (as they do other theses) or make a
major point of it.
20 See id. at 1221 (canons "simply answer the question whether a particular
meaning is linguistically permissible, if the context warrants it").
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their own analysis by the conservative belief structure of their legal
process theory.
Three things broadly characterized the belief structure of legal
process thinkers. 21 First was a sanguine view of government, what I
call "optimistic pluralism." Drawing from the standard political science
treatises in the 1950S,21 legal process thinkers believed that the purpose
of government was to resolve clashes among interests and to solve
problems that these groups could not solve on their own, and that this
politics of pluralism generally produced good policies. Second, adher-
ents of legal process accepted the values of traditional liberalism: Indi-
viduals should presumptively be left alone to pursue their own prefer-
ences, but the government might interfere when it could do so
"neutrally. '23 Government rules must be justified in some way that
does not compare preferences-either by reference to some "objective"
collective good accepted by a majority of people in the legislature, or to
a "rational" expansion of those collective decisions by interstitial
lawmakers, such as judges and bureaucrats. Third, legal process schol-
ars possessed an almost religious faith in procedure. The objectivity and
neutrality of law both resulted from and was justified by good
procedures.
While conceptions of pluralism, positivism, and proceduralism
oversimplify the legal process agenda, they were underlying assump-
tions of it and help explain why traditional legal process theory has
hesitated to embrace the idea that courts should articulate and enforce
public values. Its optimistic pluralism leaves the selection of overall val-
ues to the legislature; judicial choice of policies smacks of natural law.
Positivism questions the pedigree of decisionmaking criteria that cannot
be rigorously traced back to either constitutional or statutory provisions.
Proceduralism cautions against any judicial lawmaking, confining it to
the "interstices."
These objections to the public values idea are not as compelling
21 See generally Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in
the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691 (1987) (tracing the development
of legal process scholarship from Hart & Sacks to the post-legal-process scholarship
today, and arguing the importance of expanding legal education in the area of legisla-
tion); Eskridge, Metaprocedure (Book Review), 98 YALE L.J. 945 (1989) (analyzing
and criticizing Hart and Sacks' jurisprudential assumptions); G. Peller, "Neutral Prin-
ciples" in the 1950s (forthcoming 21 MICH. J.L. REF. (1988)) (outlining the develop-
ment of legal process scholarship).
22 See A. BENTLEY, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (2d ed. 1948); W. BINKLEY &
M. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1949); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERN-
MENTAL PROCESS (1951). See generally T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed.
1979) (surveying "interest group liberalism" theory of the 1950s and 1960s).
23 The main legal texts are H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 15; Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).
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today as they were 30 years ago. Landmark events such as Brown2 '
and its ongoing judicial implementation, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the War in Vietnam and draft resistance, Stonewall, Roe v. Wade,25
and the Equal Rights movement have, for most intellectuals, eroded the
cogency of the conservative features of the legal process philosophy. We
are cynical about the operation of pluralistic legislatures. We believe
that law is more than the positive commands of the sovereign. We are
impatient with procedural justifications that mask substantive injustice.
While we do not think we are naive about the limitations and foibles of
judges, courts command our respect more than do legislatures and exec-
utive agencies.
During the last decade, constitutional scholars have addressed
their public values philosophy to a receptive audience.26 Their scholar-
ship departs from the assumed wisdom of the 1950s in three ways. The
first departure is a renewed interest in right answers. Although old-
fashioned natural law enjoys little current academic support, many
scholars are receptive to the idea that there are norms and policies that
are "right" for our society in a given context. And "wrong" answers
cannot be validated by proceduralism. This attitude is inspired by the
Brown experience. In retrospect, it seems clear that segregation was
and is morally wrong, and it hardly matters that the political system in
the South (and the North in many cases) sanctioned it. At least here,
substance overpowers procedure. Even for the more difficult subsidiary
issues involved in implementing Brown, we are confident that discus-
sion and experience over time will suggest right and wrong answers.
The core idea of public values scholarship is that there are at least
some values, like the anti-segregation principle, that have worth and
contribute to the moral growth of our society.27
The second departure is the rejection of pluralism and an embrace
of a position similar to the republican tradition.2" Public values think-
ers posit that politics is more than the pluralist aspiration to accommo-
date interest group desires. Rather, public life allows citizens to discuss
both the common good and the moral content of their society. Hence,
the acceptance of republicanism has a descriptive as well as a normative
component. Political struggle, such as that leading to the Civil Rights
24 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26 See supra note 1.
27 See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 118
(1982); L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 9-28 (1985); Burt, supra note 1, at
500-02.
28 This characterization is most explicitly true of Ackerman, Michelman, and
Sunstein. See supra note 1.
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Act of 1964, can transform private preferences and create at least some
agreement on divisive issues.29 As a matter of aspiration, moreover, we
should encourage this process. A "community of principle," in which
legal precepts arise from the public values of the body politic, is a more
worthy, more vibrant polity than is a pluralist "rulebook commu-
nity."" Indeed, some public values scholars have persuasively argued
that the Framers of the Constitution believed that political activity in
our democracy ought to be directed towards the common good through
a process of practical reason.31 The republican tradition is just as much
part of our constitutional history as the pluralist tradition.
The third departure is a diminished concern for the countermajor-
itarian difficulty. 2 Public values thinkers believe that the dialogue by
which public values are articulated is best performed by courts, not just
by the legislature. This belief reflects disappointment in the legisla-
ture's ability to carry on a sustained dialogue as much as it reflects
faith in the courts. Modern political science scholarship depicts the leg-
islature as typically paralyzed and unable to take constructive action;
when it does bestir itself to enact laws, they are typically either feeble
compromises or, worse, unprincipled doles to special interest groups.33
While politics can transform preferences and articulate public values, it
does not do so sufficiently often in the legislature. Courts have the insti-
tutional ability to contribute more substantially to the politics of public
values, because their independence reduces the inertia and interest
group pressures of everyday politics, and because their open, reasoned,
and incremental decisionmaking assures a more rational discussion of
public issues. 4
29 See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 9, at 3-28 (Civil Rights Act of
1964 as a transformation of preferences); Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1130 & n.5 (1986) (citing the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 as the most prominent modern statute designed to shape preferences); cf. Elli-
ott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federaliza-
tion of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 313 (1985) (tracing the process by
which passage of some environmental legislation has transformed institutional incen-
tives and thereby created consensus for further measures).
SO I am using the terminology developed in R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra
note 1, at 209-10, which I believe captures the aspirations of most of the thinkerslisted
supra note 1.
31 See Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 1, at 1559-60; Sunstein, Interest Groups,
supra note 1, at 31.
" This is a departure somewhat more consciously true of Ackerman, Dworkin,
and Fiss than it is of the other thinkers. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra
note 1, at 74-76, argues the irony of republican displacement of civic virtue from the
citizenry to unelected judges.
11 See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 285-95 (1988).
"' See id. at 301-07; Fiss, supra note 1, at 14.
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The lessons of Brown-the revival of anti-pluralist political the-
ory, skepticism about the rationality of legislation, and a greater faith
in courts as sources of law's integrity-have stimulated great interest in
the public values ideal that fundamental principles and norms devel-
oped through adjudication can contribute to the common good of our
polity and to the rationality and coherence of its law. Thus far the
public values ideal has been developed almost exclusively in connection
with constitutional theory. Yet a moment's reflection will suggest the
even greater pertinence public values have for statutory interpretation.
Not only is statutory interpretation a much more frequent judicial
activity, but it has a more concrete impact on American law. Constitu-
tional invalidation of a statute is a rare occurrence, while interpretation
of statutes is, an ongoing critical enterprise. Moreover, in historical
terms, the case for using public values in statutory interpretation is a
stronger one, given the three antecedents developed above. Creative ju-
dicial review has had a roller-coaster history-Dred Scott and Lochner
(and perhaps also Roe v. Wade) exemplify the excesses of too much
bad activism, and much of the remainder of our constitutional history
has seen very little activism at all. Creative statutory interpretation, on
the other hand, has been an integral part of the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, and indeed the civil law tradition as well. The canons of construc-
tion themselves illustrate the substantial continuity of this tradition.
Finally, the use of public values to interpret, rather than invali-
date, statutes seems more acceptable politically. If the Court can de-
velop and articulate public values in the process of interpreting, as op-
posed to invalidating, statutes, there is less friction between the Court
and Congress. Indeed, the opportunities for public dialogue-between
the Court as it sets forth values of interpretation and Congress as it
drafts statutes-are potentially greater in statutory interpretation cases.
This assertion will be confirmed below by a survey of recent statutory
interpretation decisions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
II. PUBLIC VALUES IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: META-
RULES, POLICY PRESUMPTIONS, CLEAR STATEMENT RULES,
GAPFILLING PRINCIPLES, AND BACKGROUND CONTEXT
Drawing upon the historical antecedents developed in Part I, a
public values approach to statutory interpretation should emphasize ex-
panded context, the evolution of statutory principles, and the impor-
tance of background understandings. First, the interpreter should ex-
plicitly consider not just the text and legislative history of a statute, but
also its entire public law context and current concepts of reasonableness
and justice. She should reject the idea that each statute is an isolated
1989]
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deal, to be enforced according to its strict and limited terms and without
reference to other national policies. This view is supported by legal
process theory and is now widely accepted. 5
Second, the interpreter should view statutes as dynamic rather
than static. Just as constitutional provisions evolve over time, so may
statutes, through practical experience and dialogue. From that evolu-
tion, which itself reflects changed legal and social circumstances, the
interpreter might extract general statutory principles. The dynamic na-
ture of statutory interpretation goes beyond traditional legal process
theory and hence is a more controversial proposition than the expanded
context notion, but this idea is gaining increased recognition.36
Third, the interpreter should explicitly acknowledge the impor-
tance of rational background understandings-public values-when she
interprets statutes. While the canons of construction have long operated
as presumptive rules for interpreting statutes, they have generally not
been articulated in terms of underlying public values,3" until recently. 38
The interpretation given a statutory provision is often influenced, and
influenced decisively, by public values found outside the provision.
These values may have their source in the Constitution, in other stat-
utes, or in the common law. Many rules and presumptions of statutory
interpretation find their policy origin (at least partially) in our society's
commitment to particular public values, and public values are often
equally important as background context for statutory interpretation.
Physics suggests a useful metaphor: gravity. 9 Public values have a
gravitational force that varies according to their source (the Constitu-
tion, statutes, the common -law) and the degree of our historical and
contemporary commitment to these values. The gravitational force will
exercise a pull on other sources of law, including statutes. The gravita-
tional force will not affect the evolution of a statute when the force is
weak (for example, an old common law policy that is no longer compel-
ling) and the statutory language relatively clear. Yet the gravitational
" See Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 24-
27 (1988); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at 604-701.
" See Aleinikoff, supra note 35, at 46 & n.117; Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479, 1481-84, 1496-97 (1987).
a' See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STAT-
UTES 228 (1975) (asserting that most canons simply "consist of rebuttable presumptions
... that reflect the probabilities generated by normal usage or legislative behavior").
11 See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 9, at 655-59 (substantive policies
underlying many of the canons), 658-76 (rule of lenity), 676-89 (construction of stat-
utes to avoid constitutional problems), 689-95 (surveying the scholarly assaults on and
defenses of canons); C. Sunstein, supra note 9 (general theory of statutory interpreta-
tion based upon canons).
"' I apologize to physicists for expropriating a term (gravity) which has a more
precise meaning than my analogue (public values).
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force of a public value will have a decisive influence on the statutory
orbit when the force is strong (for example, a constitutional value to
which we are deeply committed) and the statutory language less dear.
To illustrate this argument, consider the following discussion of
cases in which the force of public values has affected statutory interpre-
tation. The cases reflect a broad survey of the Supreme Court's statu-
tory interpretation decisions in the last ten years (1978-88), with some
emphasis on those of the Burger Court's last Term (1985-86) and the
Rehnquist Court's first two Terms (1986-88). I have organized the
cases, first, according to the source of the public value (though of course
the sources overlap a great deal), and within each source according to
the means by which the Court considers the values (meta-rules, policy
presumptions, clear statement rules, gapfilling principles, and back-
ground context). The cases are not necessarily representative of every-
day statutory adjudications, and Part III will demonstrate that the Su-
preme Court itself is not consistent in its use of public values. The
point of this description is to show how accepted doctrines of statutory
interpretation are themselves responsive to our polity's interest in pub-
lic values and, consequently, how public values already exercise an in-
fluence in statutory interpretation.
A. Constitutional Values
Public values developed from the Constitution have the greatest
effect on statutory interpretation. This power partly results from the
special coercive force of constitutional values: Statutes not sensitive to
them stand a greater chance of invalidation. Also, constitutional values
have been articulated through a rich tradition of Supreme Court cases
and extensive academic commentary and systematic theorizing. The
thought and effort going into this uniquely public discussion have per-
ceptible effects on the Court's approach to statutes when similar issues
of statutory interpretation are raised. Statutory interpretation doctrine
has over time developed several clear statement rules and presumptions
that grow out of constitutional values and that bring those values ex-
plicitly into the interpretive process. I shall analyze first the overall
meta-rules incorporating constitutional values, and then several more
specialized rules and presumptions. This Section will conclude with ex-
amples of the spillover of constitutional argumentation and value artic-
ulation as context for related statutory issues.
1. Meta-Rules
There are three general rules of statutory interpretation that re-
flect the gravitational force of constitutional values. These meta-rules
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posit that even when Congress has the constitutional authority to enact
a particular result by statute, the Court will presume against that result
unless Congress clearly directs it. Underlying these meta-rules is the
notion that the Court should be reluctant to interpret laws expansively
when doing so would approach the constitutional periphery.
a. Interpretation to Avoid Significant Constitutional Problems
The most important meta-rule based upon constitutional values
dictates that statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional
problems. There are at least two ways of stating this meta-rule. One is
to limit it to cases in which a particular interpretation would yield an
unconstitutional statute. The rule would state only that if there are two
plausible interpretations of the statute, and one 'of them would be un-
constitutional, the Court should choose the interpretation that passes
constitutional muster.40
This version of the meta-rule, avoidance of an interpretation that
would render the statute unconstitutional, is typically given an institu-
tional competence explanation: The Court should avoid constitutional
confrontations with Congress and, hence, should find ways around un-
necessary declarations that a law is unconstitutional.4 ' Public values
analysis suggests more substantive rationales for the meta-rule: The
Court should assume that Congress is sensitive to constitutional con-
cerns and presumably would not pass an unconstitutional statute; by
0 A leading case is Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1961) (interpreting the Sherman Act of 1890 not to penal-
ize political petitioning protected by the first amendment). See also Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1931, 1939 (1988) (reiterating the
Noerr standard but finding the standard-setting process of a private trade organization
outside of "efforts to influence [the government]"); California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972) (developing a "sham" exception under
which political petitioning aimed not at securing a governmental response but rather at
placing procedural roadblocks in front of competitors may not be covered by Noerr
immunity); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (extending
the Noerr immunity to cover attempts to influence government decisionmaking with
specific intent to drive competitors out of business). For cases applying the Noerr anal-
ysis to other statutes, see Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1331
(7th Cir. 1977) (creating a Noerr-type exception to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1), which pros-
cribes interference with the public officials' legal performance of duties), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 975 (1978); Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803, 817-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Weinfeld, J.) (similarly limiting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
41 Cf Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (noting various avoidance techniques, such as not passing upon the consti-
tutionality of legislation in a friendly proceeding, not ruling in anticipation of a consti-
tutional question, and construing statutes to ensure their constitutionality if a different
construction would raise serious constitutional questions).
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narrowly construing statutes venturing close to the constitutional pe-
riphery, the Court can signal its concerns to Congress. The Court can
also update statutes by construing them to reflect society's evolving val-
ues as they relate to the Constitution. These public values explanations
are even more apt for the second version of the meta-rule: The Court
interprets a statute to avoid constitutional problems even though the
broader interpretation would not necessarily be invalid. Under this
rule, "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute
to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress."
42
A leading case for this latter version of the meta-rule is NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop.43 The NLRB had exercised jurisdiction over lay
faculty at two groups of Roman Catholic high schools, based on its
policy of declining jurisdiction only when a school is completely reli-
gious; the schools in question were only religiously associated, since sec-
ular as well as religious topics were taught. The National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) defines the NLRB's jurisdiction very broadly," and
the evolution of the statute suggested that Congress expected the NLRB
to be able to regulate religious institutions. 45 The Court's analysis be-
gan not with the statutory text and history, however, but rather with
the constitutional protection against state infringement on the free exer-
cise of religion. "The values enshrined in the First Amendment plainly
rank high 'in the scale of our national values.' In keeping with the
Court's prudential policy it is incumbent on us to determine whether
the Board's exercise of its jurisdiction here would give rise to serious
constitutional questions."
'46
Drawing from its free exercise precedents, the Court emphasized
42 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988); see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932),
quoted in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961)
("When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided."). For examples of judicial application of the Crowell-Street principle,
see Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988); NLRB v. Fruit
& Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657
(1895); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448 (1830) (Story, J.); Murray v.
The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.).
4- 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
44 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (defining as an "employer" subject to the NLRB's
jurisdiction "any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly" and
then specifically exempting eight categories of employers from such jurisdiction).
41 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 511-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 501 (opinion of the Court).
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the importance of the teacher's role in the religious mission of a church
school and concluded that there was a "significant risk that the First
Amendment will be infringed"417 by a broad interpretation of the statu-
tory jurisdiction. Since Congress had not clearly addressed the issue in
the statute or the most authoritative legislative history, the Court inter-
preted the statute not to give the NLRB jurisdiction over church
schools.
Catholic Bishop is anomalous from a traditional perspective, for
the Court's interpretation severely strains the statutory text in order to
avoid a constitutional question that the statute should easily have sur-
vived.48 The decision is at least explicable (I reserve discussion of its
correctness to Part III) from a public values perspective. Government
regulation of religious institutions is fraught with dangers of interfer-
ence with the free exercise of religion, and whenever Congress ventures
into that area it must proceed cautiously and with sensitivity to the free
exercise issues. When Congress fails to proceed in a manner cognizant
and protective of such fundamental values, the Court will give the stat-
ute a narrowing interpretation, leaving it to Congress to rethink the
issue. The Court in the 1980s has relied on this strategy in several
important cases,4" though the Court will not follow it when Congress
has clearly and precisely addressed the issue.50
47 Id. at 502.
4' Not surprisingly, traditional scholars tied to the legal process pluralist tradition
have been harshly critical of this rule. See H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 211-12 (1967);
R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285-86 (1985).
' See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988) (narrowly construing the NLRA to
avoid conflict with the first amendment); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984)
(narrowly interpreting the laws restricting travel to Cuba to avoid conflict with the due
process clause); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 n.24 (1983) (de-
clining to address equal protection issues involved in granting discriminatory schools
tax-exempt status, and deciding instead on nonconstitutional grounds based on a nar-
row interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code); United States v. Security Indus.
Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 82 (1982) (" 'In the absence of a clear expression of Congress'
intent to' apply [a provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978] to property rights
. ..'we decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court
to resolve difficult and sensitive [constitutional] questions . . . .'" (quoting Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507)); Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Da-
kota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981) (holding that the repeal of part of a statute must be
interpreted to limit its effect if such interpretation is reasonable and precludes possible
constitutional conflicts); cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (interpreting statute narrowly to avoid facial con-
stitutional problems, but invalidating statute as applied).
50 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 n.3 (1987) (requiring determina-
tion of a constitutional question regarding the applicability of the seventh amendment
to the Clean Water Act); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 98 (1985) (explicit
congressional statement required Court to test constitutionality of statute requiring
mine claims to be recorded); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652-55 (1984) (con-
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b. Interpretation to Preserve Traditional Separation of Responsibili-
ties in Government
A second meta-rule, related to the first, presumes that congres-
sional enactments do not unnecessarily trench upon the lawmaking tra-
ditionally left to other sources of government authority, namely, the
states and the coordinate branches of the federal government. That is,
even where Congress clearly has the authority to preempt state law and
provide policy rules for the coordinate federal branches, the Court will
not presume that Congress has chosen to do so, unless necessary to ef-
fectuate legislative policies. Hence, deferring to the constitutional values
inherent in federalism, the Court will "start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress" (the rule against preemption of traditional state functions).5 ' Or,
deferring to the constitutional values inherent in separation of powers,
the Court will assume that when Congress passes laws dealing with
foreign affairs and other matters where congressional and executive
power interact, Congress does not intend to interfere with traditional
executive actions (the rule against overriding traditional executive func-
tions). 52 Deferring again to the constitutional values inherent in separa-
tion of powers, the Court may also presume that Congress does not
intend to strip federal courts of their inherent powers, especially their
power to fashion creative relief in equity (the rule against overriding
traditional judicial powers).
5 3
Like the first meta-rule, this rule has traditionally been under-
stood in institutional competence terms: Statutes should be interpreted
to permit each institution of government-Congress, the President, the
judiciary, and the states-to make policy in the areas where it is most
competent to act. But this meta-rule also has a public values justifica-
tion: Unless Congress has thoughtfully considered and adopted a new
struing statute broadly, then facing constitutional issues); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467
U.S. 883, 900-02 (1984); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147, 157 &
n.10 (1983); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980).
51 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
52 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 301 & n.50 (1982) (presuming that
Congress had acquiesced in the executive's traditional authority to regulate passports);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965) (same).
'3 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 319 (1982) ("[Tihe
legislative history [of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act] does not suggest that
Congress intended to deny courts their traditional equitable discretion."); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944) ("[Ihf Congress desired to make such an abrupt
departure from traditional equity practice ... it would have made its desire plain.").
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approach to important public issues, courts should presume that the
answers being developed by those institutions that have been thinking
about them should be left in place. This meta-rule may also involve a
substantive judgment by the Court that the answers reached by those
institutions are in fact good ones. Recent examples of its application by
the Court suggest the particular cogency of the public values
explanation.
An interesting recent application of the rule against federal pre-
emption of traditional state functions is Kelly v. Robinson.54 The Court
held that restitution obligations, imposed upon a criminal defendant as
conditions of her probation in state criminal proceedings, are nondis-
chargeable obligations under Section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978. Section 523(a)(7) protects from discharge any debt "to the ex-
tent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the
benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pe-
cuniary loss. '5 5 Because a restitution is not necessarily "for the benefit
of a governmental unit" and may be viewed as "compensation for ac-
tual pecuniary loss," the statutory language does not naturally lend it-
self to the Court's interpretation.5" But the Court did not start with the
bare language. Instead, its analysis began with a history of the Bank-
ruptcy Act before its amendment in 1978; courts had uniformly inter-
preted the old Act not to discharge state criminal judgments, including
restitutionary judgments, and there was no legislative discussion in con-
nection with the 1978 Act to indicate congressional disapproval of, or
departure from, that approach.57 The Court reasoned that its "inter-
pretation of the [Act] also must reflect the . . . deep conviction that
federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state
criminal proceedings." 58 In a short discussion, the Court rehearsed
"'the fundamental policy against federal interference with state crimi-
nal prosecutions,' ,,5" and emphasized the useful rehabilitative and de-
terrent purposes served by state restitutionary remedies in criminal
cases. "This Court has recognized that the States' interest in adminis-
tering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one
of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court
considering equitable types of relief. . . . This reflection of our feder-
479 U.S. 36 (1986).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982).
66 This was the reading adopted by the Second Circuit in Robinson v. McGuigan,
776 F.2d 30, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1985), but rejected by the Supreme Court in Kelly, 479
U.S. at 50-53.
"Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50-52.
68 Id. at 47.
69 Id. (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)).
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alism also must influence our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in
this case. '"0
As Kelly suggests, the rule against preemption of traditional state
functions is often the occasion for the Court to protect important local
values from inadvertent federal interference. 1 Similarly, the rule
against overriding traditional executive powers can often be analyzed as
the Court's effort to protect rational executive lawmaking. This analy-
sis is, I believe, the best explanation of the widely criticized case of
Dames & Moore v. Regan,6" which upheld the President's power to
negotiate an executive agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran in
1981. The agreement directed the transfer of Iranian assets from this
country to Iran and to a special fund. The Court found that the execu-
tive transfer of assets was authorized by the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), which permits the President
in a national emergency to "regulate . ..any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, [or] transfer ...of. . .any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest."63 The executive
agreement also "suspended" private lawsuits against Iran in U.S.
courts so that the matters in controversy could be handled in a special
international claims tribunal. IEEPA does not directly approve such
suspension, but the Court held that Congress had "acquiesced" in the
President's authority to order it, because Congress had never objected to
previous executive agreements that similarly settled claims of U.S. citi-
zens against foreign states.64
The acquiescence argument (a classic legal process argument) is
unpersuasive. Many of the executive agreements cited by the Court
were formally ratified by the Senate or otherwise accepted by Congress,
and none was quite like the broad agreement involved in Dames &
Moore. Moreover, there was no reason to believe that Congress' inac-
60 Id. at 49 (citing Younger and Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 539-40 (1947)).
"' For other recent examples, see Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 108 S. Ct.
1704, 1711-12 (1988) (no preemption of state safety regulation of private contractor
operating nuclear power plant); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 637 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (no preemption of state child and
spousal support decree by federal anti-attachment statute); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256-58 (1984) (no preemption of state punitive damages rules by
Atomic Energy Act); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 220-23 (1983) (no Atomic Energy Act preemption of
California law limiting expansion of nuclear plants, to ensure vitality of state regula-
tion of economic development); id. at 226-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (same,
but characterizing California law in safety terms).
62 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
63 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982).
, Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-83.
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tion was not the result of inertia or simple ignorance rather than any
approval of the President's prior actions, much less of desire to forfeit
its ultimate control over such treaty dispensations.65
A better argument, one probably underlying the Court's opinion,
rests upon the perceived public value of the challenged practice. Espe-
cially in the post-World War II era, foreign countries (such as Iran)
have often nationalized or otherwise penalized U.S. companies that op-
erate within their borders. Typically, these controversies between U.S.
companies and foreign states pursuing their own national policies have
not been resolved in domestic U.S. courts. In part because such disputes
are intimately tied to long-term U.S. relations to these foreign coun-
tries, the United States needs to coordinate these disputes in light of its
evolving relations with these countries. 6 These disputes have been re-
solved by executive agreements negotiated by the President (sometimes
with the consent of Congress). In cases such as Dames & Moore, the
need for most expeditious yet definitive action to bring the fifty-two
hostages back to the United States supports a practical power for the
President to act unilaterally. Several of the Court's recent decisions
similarly rest upon the need for statutes to afford the President breath-
ing room to pursue long-term foreign policy objectives which might re-
dound to the overall common good. 7
c. Interpretation Consistent with International Law and Treaty
Obligations
By operation of the supremacy clause, the principles set forth in
international law and in treaties entered by the United States are "the
supreme Law of the Land."6 Courts will generally "interpret general
65 See Eskridge, supra note 18 (general critique of acquiescence arguments); M.
Froomkin, The Sound of One House Clapping: Theories of Congressional Acquies-
cence (draft July 1988) (criticizing Dames & Moore); see also Marks & Grabow, The
President's Foreign Economic Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by
Acquiescence, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 68, 83-92 (1982) (demonstrating that the evidence
of legislative acquiescence in Dames & Moore was in fact flimsy).
66 See generally Eskridge, The Iranian Nationalization Cases: Toward a Gen-
eral Theory of Jurisdiction over Foreign States, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 525, 566-71
(1981) (articulating this national policy and the various constitutional, statutory, and
common law bases for it).
67 See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 232-33
(1986) (upholding President's discretion to ignore Japan's past violations of interna-
tional whaling rules, notwithstanding legislation expressing congressional concern about
such violations, as part of an overall executive strategy of seeking more certain Japa-
nese compliance through executive agreement); see also Department of Navy v. Egan,
108 S. Ct. 818, 824-25 (1988) (granting executive discretion to grant national security
clearances).
66 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (treaties); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
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or ambiguous words in statutes in a manner consistent with interna-
tional law,' 69 and "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.
'70
Also, "courts do not favor repudiation of an earlier international agree-
ment by implication and require clear indications that Congress, in en-
acting subsequent inconsistent legislation, meant to supersede the ear-
lier agreement." 7' International law and treaties thus have a quasi-
constitutional status: Congress can override them, but it must do so
clearly. International law, in particular, is a rich source of public val-
ues in statutory interpretation, because its precepts are formulated
slowly, through a process of academic consensus and transnational
debate.
Under this meta-rule, the Court has often been sensitive to inter-
national comity concerns when it interprets statutes having an interna-
tional dimension.72 One justification for the result in Dames & Moore
is the binding force that executive agreements have in international re-
lations. Another recent example of the international comity meta-rule is
the Court's decision in Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) v.
Cardoza-Fonseca.7 3 Since 1980, the Immigration & Nationality Act
(INA) has provided two methods through which an otherwise deport-
700 (1900) (international law).
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 3 comment j (1965).
70 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804);
see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1963); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953).
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 145 comment b (1965); see Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1979) ("Absent explicit statu-
tory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of
treaty rights.").
7'2 For some recent examples, see Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1986) (deferring to bilateral understanding between Ja-
pan and U.S. Executive); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628-29 (1985) (concerns of international comity and the New York Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards); Trans
World Airlines v. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 243, 254-60 (1984) (updating liability rules
of U.S. version of Warsaw Convention; relying in part upon international practice);
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (preemption of state law; relying in part on
international agreements); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (interpreting
executive agreement by reference to international law); United States v. California, 447
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1980) (interpreting Submerged Lands Act by incorporating portion of
Convention on the Territorial Sea). I find inconsistent with this line of cases a divided
Court's refusal to apply the Hague Evidence Convention in Soci&E Nationale Indus-
trielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2548 (1987). See also
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2107-11 (1988)
(grudging approach to Hague Service of Process Convention).
7- 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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able noncitizen who claims she will be persecuted if deported can seek
relief. Under Section 243(h), the INS must withhold deportation if the
noncitizen demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that her
"life or freedom would be threatened" by the deportation.7 4 Congress
added Section 208(a) to the Act in 1980, authorizing the INS to grant
asylum to a noncitizen unwilling to return to her home country "be-
cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."'75 The INS took the position that the standards of
proof in Sections 208(a) and 243(h) are the same and, hence, that a
refugee seeking the INS's protection under Section 208(a) must show a
probability of persecution. The Court rejected the INS's interpretation,
in part because it is inconsistent with a natural reading of the statutory
language and with tht legislative history.
The Court also relied on an imputed legislative desire to conform
to the standards of the 1967 United Nations Multilateral Protocol Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees (to which the United States has
formally acceded)76 and related international documents (which the
United States has not formally accepted). The 1967 Protocol provided
clear support for the Court's interpretation of the INA to create a
broader class of refugees that could receive discretionary relief. The
Court was "further guided" by the analysis of the well-founded fear
standard in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status, promulgated by the Office of the U.N. High Commis-
sioner (and also not formally acceded to by the United States)." The
Court's message in Cardoza-Fonseca is a distinctly public values one:
The interpretation of a statute touching upon asylum might be influ-
enced by the evolving wisdom of international consensus.
2. Specific Presumptions & Clear Statement Rules
The rules discussed above-avoidance of constitutional problems,
protection of separate governmental responsibilities, and deference to
international law and treaties-are the meta-rules by which a variety
of Constitution-based public values affect statutory interpretation. A
74 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982), as interpreted in INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421
n.15 (1984).
75 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982), as defined in id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
76 19 U.S.T. 6223, TIAS No. 6577.
"' See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438-41 (relying on the High Commissioner's
analysis and finding it "consistent" with the Court's review of the Protocol's meaning);




number of other maxims are more focused in their constitutional con-
cerns. They can be phrased as either clear statement rules (the Court
will interpret the statute in a certain way unless Congress clearly ex-
presses a contrary intention), or as presumptions (Congress is presumed
to accept a certain interpretation), or simply as weights in a balance
(ambiguity will be resolved in favor of a particular value). I shall ex-
amine three such maxims: the rule of lenity in criminal cases, the pre-
sumption of state immunity, and the rule protecting "Carolene
groups."
a. Rule of lenity
The "rule of lenity" for interpreting criminal statutes is a special
version of the meta-rule that statutes should be interpreted to avoid
constitutional questions and is most susceptible to a public values read-
ing. The rule of lenity rests upon the due process value that govern-
ment should not punish people who have no reasonable notice that
their activities are criminally culpable; as well as the separation-of-
powers value that prosecutors and courts should be unusually cautious
in expanding upon legislative prohibitions where the penalty is se-
vere.7 8 The rule of lenity is usually stated simply: Penal statutes should
be strictly, or narrowly, construed. "[W]hen choice has to be made be-
tween two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is
appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite."
79
Given its grounding in the fair notice and reasonable penalty precepts
of due process, the rule is applied most generously when the questioned
conduct is accepted by general social norms and least frequently when
the questioned conduct is widely considered horrible. °
The Court in the 1980s has frequently invoked the rule of lenity."'
71 See United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (1988) (uncertainty re-
solved in favor of lenity to avoid "the arbitrariness and unfairness of a legal system in
which the judges would develop the standards for imposing criminal punishment on a
case-by-case basis"); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972)
(striking down vagrancy ordinance that implicated due process concern over "arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of the law").
71 United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952),
quoted in United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971).
So See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881) ("a law which pun-
ished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the commu-
nity would be too severe for that community to bear"); J.W. HURST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES 64-65 (1982) (courts follow general community standards as context in
which to construe sweep of statutory text).
81 See, e.g., Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2764 ("[W]e adhere to the time-honored
interpretive guideline that uncertainty concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should
be resolved in favor of lenity."); Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1557 (1988)
19891 1029
1030 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
One of its most interesting invocations came in McNally v. United
States, 2 which interpreted the federal mail fraud statute to be applica-
ble only when the fraud involves property rights and inapplicable when
the fraud consists of depriving the citizenry of intangible rights to hon-
est government. The Court's opinion relied on the statutory text, its
legislative history, parallel common law developments, and the purpose
of the statute, though the dissenting opinion presented an unusually
persuasive critique of each asserted ground. 8 What may have been de-
cisive to the Court was its fear that the common law development of the
mail fraud statute had become so unbounded that virtually any argua-
bly unethical conduct could be brought within its penalty. 4 The expan-
sion of criminal culpability without clearer legislative authorization im-
plicated the rule of lenity concerns for cabining prosecutorial discretion
and ensuring adequate notice; these concerns were especially acute in a
case that also implicated federalism values. Consequently, the Court
invoked the rule of lenity and chose the less expansive reading of the
statute.8 5
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (denaturalization for making false statements
"patently excessive"); Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2753 (1987) (amhbigu-
ity in criminal statutes resolved in favor of lenity); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S.
207, 229 (1985) (same); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (same);
Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 290 (1982) (same). On the other hand, the
Court has declined to invoke the rule of lenity in cases where it was arguably applica-
ble. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 108 S.
Ct. 1404, 1413 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rule of lenity should have been applied
to require a strict construction of the penal provisions protecting U.S. postal monopoly);
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 83 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rule of
lenity should have been applied); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 29 (1983)
(rule of lenity inapplicable where "the language of the RICO forfeiture provision is
clear").
812 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987); see also Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316,
320 (1987) (distinguishing McNally).
88 Compare McNally, 107 S. Ct at 2879-81 (interpreting mail fraud statute in
light of text, legislative history, parallel common law developments, and statutory pur-
pose) with id. at 2884-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing each argument supporting
the majority's interpretation of the statute).
84 See id. at 2881 (expressing desire not to construe statute in a way that would
leave "its outer boundaries ambiguous"); id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I recog-
nize that there may have been some overly expansive applications of § 1341 in the
past."); see also United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 141-44 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (persuasive critique of the com-
mon law expansion of § 1341), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
8 See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 ("Rather than construe the statute in a man-
ner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in
setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we
read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress desires
to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has."). Congress amended § 1341 in
1988 to overrule McNally.
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b. Presumption of State Immunity
The eleventh amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." '86 The Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment broadly,
to prohibit lawsuits in admiralty (in addition to the "suit in law or
equity" in the amendment) and to prohibit lawsuits by citizens of the
state (in addition to "Citizens of another State, or ... Foreign State" in
the amendment).8 ' The Court has recognized that a state may waive its
eleventh amendment immunity and that Congress can abrogate that im-
munity in lawsuits pursuant to federal statutes. As to the latter, the
Court is reluctant to interpret a federal statute so as to abrogate a
state's constitutional immunity and in recent years has created a clear
statement rule to this effect. "Congress must express its intention to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the
statute itself."'88
The Court applied this strong presumption against congressional
abrogation of state immunity most recently in Welch v. Texas Depart-
ment of Highways & Public Transportation."9 The Jones Act provides
a remedy for "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment."90 A closely divided Court held that this
"'general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of une-
quivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment.' "91 Welch is grounded in the public values implicated in the
eleventh amendment and the broader precepts of federalism, but it also
illustrates the dynamic nature of the public values approach to statutes.
The 1980s Court has been more aggressive in its application of this
88 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
87 See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 503, 511 (1921) ("public property [a vessel]
of a State used and employed for public and governmental purposes" exempt from
seizure by admiralty process in rem); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 21 (1890) (a
state may not be sued in federal court even on a federal question by one of its own
citizens). But see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259-80 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Hans and arguing that the eleventh amendment
should prevent federal jurisdiction over suits against a state only in the absence of a
federal question).
88 Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 243; see also Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (unwilling to infer congressional abroga-
tion without clear evidence, given the "vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in our federal system").
89 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
90 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982).
91 Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2947 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 246).
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clear statement rule. Indeed Welch overruled 2 Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Alabama Docks Department,3 which had interpreted simi-
larly general language of a similar federal statute to abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity.
c. Protection of "Carolene Groups"
A third special rule of statutory interpretation is not stated as such
in any of the Court's decisions but can be discerned from their overall
pattern: Statutes affecting certain discrete and insular minori-
ties-"Carolene groups" 9 -shall be interpreted, where possible, for
the benefit of those minorities. The inspiration for this maxim is the
special equal protection scrutiny applied by the Court to statutes that
adversely affect Carolene groups. Groups receiving this protection are
racial groups (especially blacks and Native Americans), women, and
noncitizens. The constitutional values served by strict scru-
tiny-counteracting possible prejudice against these groups and ensur-
ing that the political process treats them fairly-also show up in statu-
tory interpretation cases. Their presence is alien to traditional theory
and strong evidence that public values play an important role in statu-
tory interpretation. This precept of interpretation can be found in two
types of cases.
In some cases, the Court will explicitly announce that statutes
should not readily be interpreted against a Carolene group. For exam-
ple, in Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court adverted to "the longstanding prin-
ciple of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in
favor of the alien."9 The rule of lenity is often applied with particular
care when the rights of noncitizens are involved."8 Similarly, the Court
will usually interpret ambiguous treaties and statutes affecting Native
92 See id. at 2947-48 (Powell, J., plurality opinion); id. at 2958 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment).
9' 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 718 (1985) (as-
serting that the four operative terms in the Carolene test-prejudice, discrete, insular,
and minorities-attempt to identify groups "unconstitutionally deprived of their fair
share of democratic influence").
Il Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449 (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225
(1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S.
6, 10 (1948)).
9 See Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1557 (1988) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (stating that there is a "special burden on the Government when
it seeks to denaturalize an American citizen"); cf. United States v. Campos-Serrano,
404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971) (language of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 construed strictly to withhold
criminal penalty for possessing a counterfeit alien registration card); Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388-89 (10th Cir. 1981) (relying also on defer-
ence to international law rules against indefinite detention of noncitizens).
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Americans in favor of the latter. "Doubtful expressions are to be re-
solved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of
the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith."97
Blacks and women are not the focus of federal statutes as often as
are noncitizens and Native Americans. Nonetheless, the rule protecting
marginalized groups sometimes protects blacks and women. The best
examples are cases in which general duties created by federal law ap-
pear to clash with private or public efforts to compensate blacks and
women for unique disadvantages they suffer or have suffered. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. 8 This statute obvi-
ously protects blacks and women from "discrimination" against them,
but its language also might be read to prevent affirmative action, or
"discrimination," to help them. Notwithstanding substantial support in
the legislative history for that interpretation, the Court in United Steel-
workers v. Weber9" held that under some circumstances Title VII does
not preclude employers and unions from adopting voluntary affirmative
action for black employees. The Court reaffirmed and expanded upon
Weber, and applied it to affirmative action programs for women as
well, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency.1"'
As amended in 1978, Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of sex includes discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy,"
and provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work."' 0'1 The Court in California Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Guerra'0 2 held that Title VII does not prohibit or
preempt a state law requiring reinstatement of workers on pregnancy
leave, even though that right is not accorded to male workers on similar
types of leave.' Essential to this conclusion was the Weber-based ar-
97 Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930), quoted in McClanahan v. State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); see also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397
U.S. 620, 631 (1970) ("[Tlhis Court has often held that treaties with the Indians must
be interpreted as they would have understood them.., and any doubtful expressions in
them should be resolved in the Indians' favor."); Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (upholding Native American hunting and
fishing rights that were conferred by treaty, "'since the intention to abrogate or modify
a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress'" (quoting Pigeon River Co. v.
Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934))).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
9 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
100 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
101 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
102 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
'03 See id. at 290-92.
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gument that the pregnancy discrimination language was added to pro-
tect women against traditional discrimination and that it would be
anomalous to interpret this remedial provision to invalidate a law
meant to promote equal employment opportunities for women."',
3. Background Context
Guerra, Weber, and Johnson illustrate a broader way in which
constitutional values may affect statutory interpretation. The public
values articulated in constitutional cases may frame the arguments in
analogous statutory cases, provide useful experience from which the
Court can draw in evaluating the consequences of different interpreta-
tions, and influence-though. not necessarily dictate-the direction in
which the interpreter is willing to bend the statute. Critical background
experiences influencing the Court's willingness to allow some affirma-
tive preferment include the efforts to remedy both segregation after
Brown and employment discrimination after the passage of Title VII.
A year before Weber, five members of the Court held in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.. 5 that affirmative action in public
college admissions is acceptable under some circumstances, namely, to
promote diversity or to redress the continuing effects of past discrimina-
tion. This holding reflected almost a decade of intense public debate
about affirmative preferences and validated the concept that nondis-
crimination-the key term in both the constitutional and statutory
cases-does not always mean pure color or gender blindness." 6
The continuing statutory ramifications of Bakke were abundantly
evident in the Court's 1985 and 1986 Terms. The Court not only de-
cided Johnson and Guerra, but also several other cases exploring the
consequences of Weber.' The Court, or at least some of the Justices,
adverted to the constitutional principles in several of these cases for the
proposition that "affirmative race-conscious relief may provide an effec-
tive means of remedying the effects of past discrimination."' 0 8 Of
I" See id. at 292-95 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
105 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
108 See Johnson, 480 U.S. 642-44 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
107 For analytical surveys of these cases, see Ortiz & Rutherglen, Affirmative Ac-
tion Under the Constitution and Title VII. From Confusion to Convergence, 35
UCLA L. REV. 467 (1988); Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases:
It's All Over But the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524 (1987).
'08 Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 450 n.27
(1986); see Local 93, Int'l Ass'n Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 516
(1986) (interpreting Weber as holding "that the voluntary action available to employers
and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimination may include reasonable race-con-
scious relief that benefits individuals who were not actual victims of discrimination").
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course, the constitutional values underlying Weber do not mandate that
Title VII should be interpreted the same as the Constitution, and John-
son may grant broader permission for voluntary private programs than
the post-Bakke cases would permit for public employers. Nonetheless,
the constitutional cases continue to exercise influence on the statutory
cases, and Justice O'Connor for one favors closer congruence. l 9
The role of public values as background context in statutory inter-
pretation is the best way to understand the Supreme Court's curious
interpretation of the charitable institutions exemption provision of the
Internal Revenue Code in Bob Jones University v. United States.110
The Code exempts from income taxation institutions "organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational pur-
poses." ' The Court held that Bob Jones University, obviously an
"educational" institution, was not entitled to the exemption, because it
prescribed racially discriminatory admissions standards. To get around
the statutory language apparently entitling Bob Jones to the exemption,
the Court argued that the underlying purpose of the tax exemption is
to subserve overall public policy goals, which a racially discriminatory
institution does not do. The Court also relied upon Congress' failure to
overturn the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rule in the 1970s, not-
withstanding extensive debate within and outside Congress and several
legislative proposals to change it. These are classic legal process argu-
ments, yet they are patently unpersuasive in Bob Jones. The Court rad-
ically oversimplified the purpose of the exemption, which also aims to
foster a diversity of viewpoints intrinsic to a pluralistic society." 2 That
purpose does not support the Court's interpretation. Nor is the acquies-
cence argument wholly persuasive, since much the same argument
could have been made in favor of the opposite interpretation, in which
Congress apparently acquiesced before the IRS changed the rule in
1970.113
It is not clear that the legal process reasoning in Bob Jones even
amounts to a serious effort to justify the Court's decision, but a public
values explanation suggests a more cogent basis for that decision. 4 It
I0" See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 647-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
110 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
1 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
1 See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 609-10 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment); Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (exemptions are granted because "each group contributes to the diversity of
association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society").
11. See Eskridge, supra note 18, at 90; Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion, and Pub-
lic Policy: Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 8-12.
14 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 606-07 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
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starts with the question: Do we as a society want to give tax breaks to
institutions that discriminate on the basis of race? Our answer is "no"
because of the constitutional values generated by the Brown cases. To
be sure, Brown only applies to state-sanctioned discrimination, and the
civil rights statutes and regulations adopted in the 1960s and 1970s did
not directly apply to Bob Jones, a private institution not accepting fed-
eral grants. Yet Brown has come to stand for a much broader public
value: racial segregation, especially in education, is wrong. Given this
public value, whose gravitational force is among the strongest of all, the
Court was reluctant to reject the agency's new interpretation of the
Code's tax exemption.
B. Statutory Values
Because constitutional values are fundamentally "constitutive" of
our public society, they naturally are the primary and most dramatic
source of public values in statutory interpretation. But statutes them-
selves can be the source of public values. While many statutes are not
much more than ad hoc deals, as the economists teach us, other statutes
are sources for more enduring principles and values. For example, one
of the most fundamental public values of my generation is concern for
the environment, and environmental statutes and regulations have ar-
ticulated this value for us.115 In this Section, I want to demonstrate the
ways in which statute-generated public values may influence statutory
interpretation, using the same categories deployed in the Section on
Constitution-generated public values.
1. Meta-Rules
Fundamental to a public values approach to statutory interpreta-
tion is the notion that statutes are more than a series of ad hoc deals,
and that typically statutes embody some overall policy rationality. Pol-
icy rationality suggests three related propositions: (1) different provi-
sions of the same statute fit together in a coherent way and embody a
reasonable public policy; (2) the statute is consistent with other statutes,
so that the different statutes fit together coherently; and (3) the statute
develops coherently over time. It would be an overstatement to say that
these precepts always guide the Supreme Court's interpretation of stat-
utes, but these precepts do seem to exert a consistent and pervasive
influence and are routinely noted by the Court. Again, I shall use re-
cent cases to illustrate these meta-rules of interpretation.
"I See Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 29, at 335.
[Vol. 137:1007
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
a. The Purposive Whole Act Rule
One established canon of construction is the purposive whole act
rule, which seeks to impose some degree of coherence within a single
statute. "When 'interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to
a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take
in connection with it the whole statute ... and the objects and policy of
the law, as indicated by its various provisions.' "116 The rule assumes
that a statute should be interpreted to serve its rational, purposive pol-
icy and is frequently invoked in Supreme Court opinions. 17 While
classic legal process theory endorses "purposive" interpretation of stat-
utes,"' a public values approach uses this approach more aggressively.
Public values analysis better captures the Court's own use of pur-
posive interpretation in two different kinds of cases. First, traditional
legal process theory teaches that a statute's purpose cannot overcome
116 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974); see Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421
U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy."); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) ("[A] reading of
the statute as a whole, with due regard to its purpose, requires application of the whole
law of the State where the act or omission occurred.").
117 In many of the Court's decisions, there is at least some argument supporting
the Court's interpretation based upon the overall statutory purpose. See, e.g., Citicorp
Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694, 2700-01 (1987) (applying the Fair Labor
Standards Act to limit resale of goods produced under substandard conditions, in order
to promote the Act's overall policy of eliminating such goods' competitive advantage).
In some opinions overall purpose is the key argument. See, e.g., Houston v. Lack, 108
S. Ct. 2379, 2381-85 (1988) (using overall purposes of notice to interpret FED. R. APp.
P. (4)(a)(1)); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666, 1671-74 (1988)
(interpreting the deferral provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in
light of the "'policy of the legislation as a whole'" prohibiting discrimination); Busi-
ness Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1520-25 (1988)
(finding vertical restraints not per se illegal under § I of the Sherman Act because they
do not necessarily restrain trade); Langley v. FDIC, 108 S. Ct. 396, 399-403 (1987)
(broad interpretation of FDIC statute, to ensure complete bank records); McNally, 107
S. Ct. at 2879-82 (reversing convictions under the mail fraud statute because the act
aims to protect only property rights); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337 (1987) (enforcing arbitration of statutory rights, based on Arbi-
tration Act's strong policy favoring arbitration); United States v. Hohri, 107 S. Ct.
2246, 2251-53 (1987) (finding a congressional intent to increase "nationwide uniform-
ity in certain areas of the law," and therefore holding that cases presenting both nontax
Little Tucker Act claims and Federal Tort Claims Act issues may be appealed only to
the Federal Circuit); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2216-19
(1987) (finding no federal preemption because it would not further ERISA's purposes
"to afford employees the advantages of a uniform set of administrative procedures gov-
erned by a single set of regulations"); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 631-34 (1987)
(allowing states to require disabled veterans to pay child support out of their benefits
because it coincides with "Congress' intent to provide veterans' disability compensation
for the benefit of both [the recipient] and his dependents").
18 See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 15, at 1200-01.
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the plain meaning of the statute,119 and the Court often relies on this
idea. 2 ° But the Court often invokes the purposive whole act rule pre-
cisely when the text seems dead against the desired interpretation. The
Court may be viewed as having done just that in Weber, Bob Jones,
Johnson, Guerra, and Kelly. 2' Notwithstanding the argument (made
in a dissenting opinion in each case) that a clear text and supporting
legislative history prescribed a contrary result, the Court in each case
relied instead upon a purpose-of-the-statute analysis. In Kelly, for ex-
ample, the Court's holding that state criminal restitution orders are not
discharged in bankruptcy was in tension with Section 523(a)(7) of the
Bankruptcy Act, which protects only a penalty that is "payable to and
for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for. ac-
tual pecuniary loss." '122 In bending the apparent meaning of the text,
the Court candidly admitted that it found the text only "the starting
point" for interpretation and then proceeded to "look to the provisions
of the whole law, and to its object and policy."' 23
Second, traditional legal process theory tends to speak in terms of
the original legislative purposes, while public values analysis suggests
that a statute's purpose can and usually will evolve over time. For in-
stance, the original purposes of Title VII were to produce a color-blind
society and to provide more job opportunities for minorities. When the
statute was enacted, legislators thought-or pretended to think-that
these were consistent purposes. Over time, they were revealed to be
somewhat inconsistent, because continuing effects of discrimination
were felt by minorities. Hence, in Weber the Court gave priority to the
job opportunities purpose (which supports affirmative action), a prior-
ity that is at odds with the original legislative assumptions. 4 The
119 Id. at 1412 ("[A] court ought never to give the words of a statute meaning they
will not bear .... ).
2 See, e.g., Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2087, 2092 (1988)
("There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes." (quoting
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940))).
121 Guerra, 479 U.S. at 284, and Weber, 443 U.S. at 201, quoted from Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892): "[A] thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
within the intention of its makers."
122 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982).
12 Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53 (multiple quotation marks omitted). This quotation has
a long lineage in Supreme Court opinions. It derives from United States v. Heirs of
Boisdor6, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 121 (1850), by way of Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956), and Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S.
207, 221 (1986).
14 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that "discard-
ing the principle of nondiscrimination where no countervailing statutory policy exists
appears to be at odds with the bargain struck when Title VII was enacted"); Eskridge,
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Court carried out a similar transformation of original legislative pur-
pose in Bob Jones and Guerra.
b. The In Pari Materia Rule and The Rule Against Implied Repeals
There is no federal rule of statutory interpretation that forces dif-
ferent statutory schemes to be harmonious, but there are two rules that
ameliorate those disharmonies and even encourage a policy dialogue.
One is the "in pari materia rule": Where a federal law is similar to (in
pari materia with) another federal law, the Court will presumptively
interpret the former law consistently with the other and will rely on
prior interpretations of one to interpret the other. The Supreme Court
typically explains this rule by reference to the traditional legal process
idea of imputed legislative intent: "[W]here ... Congress adopts a new
law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be
presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the in-
corporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute."'28 But
sometimes this rule is an occasion for the Court to harmonize statutory
policy and to articulate public values.'" 6
In Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission127 the
Court applied this rule to interpret the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, which governs a federal-state program of benefits to unemployed
workers. 2 ' The states administer the program but are constrained by
certain statutory rules. Section 3304(a)(12) of the Act mandates that
cno person shall be denied compensation ... solely on the basis of
pregnancy or termination of pregnancy."' 9 Although most states re-
garded leave on account of pregnancy as a voluntary termination for
good cause, thereby entitling workers to unemployment benefits, Mis-
souri and a few other states defined "leaving for good cause" narrowly.
In these states, all workers who left their jobs were disqualified from
supra note 36, at 1488-94 (discussing Weber).
125 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978); see Kungys v. United States, 108
S. Ct. 1537, 1546 (1988) (in an action to revoke citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a),
construing "material" as having the same meaning that Congress had given it in previ-
ous statutes); Western Air Lines v. Board of Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 130-31 & n.*
(1987) (defining "in lieu tax," as used in 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d), in light of the legisla-
tive history of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act).
12 See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-49, 50-51 (1987)
(relying on the McCarran-Ferguson Act to conclude that a Mississippi law of bad faith
does not fall under the savings clause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987) ("The pre-
sumption that similar language in two labor law statutes has a similar meaning is fully
confirmed by the legislative history of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.").
127 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
128 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12. Id. § 3304(a)(12).
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benefits unless they left for reasons directly attributable to the work.
Thus, while Missouri treated women leaving for pregnancy reasons no
differently from other workers leaving for non-job reasons, the plaintiff
argued that Section 3304(a)(12) is more than an antidiscrimination
statute and requires preferential treatment for pregnant women.130 The
text of the statute is not helpful to that argument, and the legislative
history of Section 3304(a)(12) is ambiguous. A decisive consideration
for the unanimous Court was that it had "construed language similar
to that in § 3304(a)(12) as prohibiting disadvantageous treatment,
rather than mandating preferential treatment."1 ' Thus, the Court
cited its interpretation of a recent statute protecting veterans against
employment penalties because of their reserve duties. That interpreta-
tion, in turn, rested upon a line of cases in which the Court had devel-
oped a reasoned approach to veterans' protection statutes, emphasizing
nondiscrimination against veterans but not favoritism (unless clearly
mandated by the statute)." 2 In short, the in pari materia rule was the
Wimberly Court's way of applying the principles long developed by the
Court in areas of intense discussion (veterans' statutes) to a new statu-
tory scheme.
A second rule harmonizing different statutes is the rule that "re-
peals by implication are not favored."' 3" That is, "courts are not at
liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when
two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts,
absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to
regard each as effective."' 3 4 The Court will reconcile the two statutes
in order to give maximum effect to the policy of each, and to give
1I See Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 514-18. 6
... Id. at 517 (citing Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 (1981) (interpret-
ing Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974), and Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (interpreting Rehabilitation Act of
1973)).
"' The leading case, Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S.
275, 284-291 (1946), interpreted the first modern veterans' job protection statute, the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, and articulated the same nondiscrimina-
tion-but-not-mandatory-preference idea that the Court reiterated in connection with the
1974 Act in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
..3 Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); see also Saint Mar-
tin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981) ("'In the
absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible
justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irrec-
oncilable.'" (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974))); Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (quoting Posadas rule); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (same); Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968) (acknowledging the rule
against implied repeals).
"3, Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551.
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greater effect to the statute that more clearly focuses on the issue in the
case."3 5 As a formal matter, the rule is justified as an indication of orig-
inal legislative intent, or at least as the best way to reconcile apparently
conflicting legislative signals.13 6 As a functional matter, the rule is often
a method for courts to develop public values from earlier statutes and
thereby narrow or expand the effect of later ones.
Several cases in the last several Terms applied this rule,137 but the
most interesting and elaborate application of the rule is still the leading
case, Morton v. Mancari.ss The Indian Reorganization Act of 193439
gives Native Americans a preference for employment with the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA). Plaintiffs challenged this employment prefer-
ence as violating the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,140
which extended Title VII and its rule of nondiscrimination on the basis
of race to federal government employment. Plaintiffs' position was sol-
idly founded upon the sweeping language of the 1972 Act and the core
meaning of nondiscrimination, yet the Court upheld the preference
based in large part upon the rule against implied repeals. That, in
turn, was largely informed by the Court's public values analysis. A
series of federal statutes dating back to 1834 have pursued the prefer-
ence for Native Americans in the government organs dealing with Na-
tive American affairs. The Court found that the underlying justifica-
tions for this time-tested legislative policy have been "to give Indians a
greater participation in their own self-government; to further the Gov-
s'" ,'Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be
controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.'"
Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550-51); see Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2494, 2497 (1987) (holding that FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(d), which grants district courts discretion to tax appropriate costs, does not
nullify a more specific statute listing taxable costs).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668, 681 n.9 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("We can presume with certainty that Congress is aware of this longstand-
ing presumption [against implied repeals] and that Congress relies on it in drafting
legislation . . . . Changing the weight to be accorded this presumption alters the legal
landscape. [And it] increase[s] the risk that we will reach an erroneous
interpretation.").
I" See Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372, 1381 (1988) (applied in interpreting
the 1978 Rehabilitation Act amendments); Crawford Fitting Co., 107 S. Ct. at 2497
(holding that FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) does not impliedly repeal federil statutes limiting
the compensation of expert witnesses); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480
U.S. 557, 564-67 (1987) (holding that the Railway Labor Act does not repeal any part
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act); Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522,
523-26 (1987) (per curiam) (Probation Act was not superseded by the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act).
138 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
139 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1934, ch.
576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984, 986).
140 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1982).
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ernment's trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the
negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect In-
dian tribal life."1 4' The policy was a keystone of the 1934 Act, which
was a legislative decision to shift greater control of Native American
affairs to Native American tribes themselves; this shift was to be ac-
complished in part by strengthening the BIA's preference for employ-
ing Native Americans. The Court was reluctant to interpret the 1972
Act as repealing this policy without public discussion that was more
focused on the preference for Native Americans. "The preference is a
longstanding, important component of the Government's Indian pro-
gram. The anti-discrimination provision [of the 1972 Act], aimed at
alleviating minority discrimination in employment, obviously is
designed to deal with an entirely different and, indeed, opposite
problem."42
c. Rule of Deliberative Statutory Evolution
Statutes develop over time through judicial interpretation, agency
interpretation (where applicable), and legislative amendment. Though
not stated as such in the cases, the Supreme Court follows a rule of
deliberative statutory evolution. That is, the Court encourages a step-
by-step development of statutory policy by implementing institutions
(courts, agencies, or the executive), thereby promoting orderly change
and measured continuity.
For statutes with no associated agency, the Court itself is charged
with the case-by-case development of the statute, with occasional (typi-
cally episodic) legislative intervention. The Court is very much con-
cerned that each decision interpreting a statute build upon the princi-
ples and lessons articulated in the Court's prior decisions interpreting
that statute (and, sometimes, on its decisions interpreting related stat-
utes). This concern shows up in the Court's "super-strong presumption
against overruling statutory precedents."' 4 That is, the Court is gener-
ally more reluctant to reconsider its statutory precedents than to recon-
sider and overrule its constitutional or common law precedents."' One
141 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541-42 (footnotes omitted).
142 Id. at 550.
x' See generally Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361
(1988) (analyzing the super-strong presumption).
144 See id.; see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985) (Supreme Court
decisions on which Congress has later based a statute have especially compelling stare
decisis value); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736-37 (1977) ("considera-
tions of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Con-
gress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation"); Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1976) (where Congress declined to modify the Supreme
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rationale for the unusual stare decisis effect given to statutory prece-
dents is that each judicial interpretation of a statute is a building block
upon which private parties, Congress, and the Court itself build. 45 So
long as Congress does not disapprove the interpretation, the strong pre-
sumption is that the interpretation (even if demonstrably wrong) ought
to stand. For example, the Johnson Court relied on this argument to
support its refusal to reconsider the Weber precedent. 4
When the Court considers statutes that charge an agency with im-
plementing the statute, the Court will defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion in most cases. " 'If [the agency's] choice represents a reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not
one that Congress would have sanctioned.' ,"' This reasoning has been
increasingly popular in Supreme Court opinions of the 1980s. 48 Again,
the rule of deference to agency interpretation has a traditional legal
process justification-the Court should not make law in areas where
agencies are more institutionally competent and are delegated formal
authority. 49 The rule also has a powerful public values justification
similar to the quasi-constitutional rules that defer to state lawmaking
Court's interpretation of a statute "there is no basis for deviating from the well-settled
principles of stare decisis applicable to this Court's construction of federal statutes").
145 See Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool ofJudicial Supremacy, 25 T.x. L.
REv. 247, 250-52 (1947) (if the Court changes its interpretation of a statute, it is
taking on a legislative function by "changing an established rule of law under which
society has been operating"); Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L.
REV. 501, 523-40 (1948) (supporting the doctrine that prior judicial decisions involving
statutory interpretation should be viewed as more compelling than decisions relating to
case law and constitutional interpretation). Both Horack and Levi are discussed in Es-
kridge, supra note 143, at 1397-1402.
I48 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629-30 n.7 (1987); see United States v. Johnson, 481
U.S. 681, 686 & n.6 (1987) (same); Eskridge, supra note 18, at 92-94 (discussing
Johnson and Weber).
147 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 845 (1984) (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)); see
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (leading case for deference to administrative
interpretation).
148 Consider its constant invocation in the 1987 Term alone. See Mississippi
Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 108 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1817
(1988); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666, 1676 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 108 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1988)
(White, J., concurring in the judgment); Gardebring v. Jenkins, 108 S. Ct. 1306, 1314
& n.16 (1988); Honig v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592, 605 n.8 (1988); NLRB v. United Food
& Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413, 421 (1987); see also id. at
426 (Scalia, J., concurring) (very strong statement of Chevron rule).
149 See Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549 (1985).
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for local matters and executive lawmaking for foreign affairs. The
Court is somewhat more likely to defer to an agency's interpretation
when it is fair-minded and carefully deliberated than when the inter-
pretation is apparently grounded in pressure politics or is an unmindful
adherence to tradition."' 0
The public values justification is apparent in a comparison of two
cases decided within a week of one another in the 1986 Term. In Car-
doza-Fonseca, the Court refused to defer to the interpretation adopted
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), charged with implemen-
tation of the statute. Formally, the Court reasoned that the BIA inter-
pretation was overwhelmed by the statutory language and history (in-
cluding the international law background). But the Court also seemed
suspicious about the diligence of the BIA to its public duties, citing "the
inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years"''
and "the years of seemingly purposeful blindness by the [agency],
which only now begins its task of developing the standard entrusted to
its care." '152 Five days earlier, in School Board v. Arline,'5" the Court
relied heavily upon Department of Health & Human Services (HHS)
regulations to interpret the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to prohibit dis-
crimination against a schoolteacher with contagious tuberculosis. Even
though the HHS regulations were only interpretive and ordinarily
would not carry preclusive weight, the Court treated them with great
deference-because they were formulated through an unusually public
process (including the opportunity for Congressional debate)'" and ar-
guably also because they reinforced the Court's "own sense of
fairness." '55
'50 For recent examples of the Court's refusal to defer to poorly deliberated
agency interpretations, see Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 636 (1986)
(stating that "there is nothing in the administrative record to justify the Secretary's
belief that 'discriminatory withholding of medical care' in violation of § 504 provides
any support for federal regulation"); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468
U.S. 137, 144 (1984) (finding that "post hoc rationalizations by counsel for agency
action are entitled to little deference: 'it is the administrative official and not appellate
counsel who possesses the expertise that can enlighten and rationalize the search for the
meaning and intent of Congress'" (citation omitted)); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983) (voiding National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration withdrawal of passive restraint regulation, holding that agency's
failure to consider alternatives such as airbags was "arbitrary and capricious").
151 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446 n.30.
152 Id. at 452 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
151 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
154 Id. at 283-84 & n.10.
... Id. at 289 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). But see id. at 286-87 n.15 (majority's
answer to dissent's fairness charge).
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2. Clear Statement Rules & Presumptions
The meta-rules discussed above are the Court's overall guidelines
for drawing public values from particular statutory schemes and for
harmonizing different statutory schemes over time. Other rules of inter-
pretation have been developed by the Court from particular lines of
statutes. Over a period of time, Congress enacts and amends statutes
that represent a general policy preference. Obviously, the statutes are
applied to the specific problems at which they are directed, or which
fall within their textual ambit. But sometimes the Court also extrapo-
lates a broader principle from the line of statutes, much as it might
extrapolate a principle from a line of common law cases. 56 The princi-
ple can be expressed as a presumption of interpretation or as a clear
statement rule. While there are a good many such presumptions and
rules, only three will be explored here.
a. Presumption of Arbitrability (Plus an Exception)
Traditional common law was hostile to private arbitration agree-
ments, since these agreements effectively usurped judicial jurisdiction to
resolve disputes. The Federal Arbitration Act of 192557 was enacted to
reverse this common law hostility by ensuring that courts would enforce
arbitration agreements upon the same terms as they enforce other con-
tracts 58 and not proceed with a lawsuit whose claims are subject to an
enforceable arbitration agreement. 159 The Arbitration Act has been a
highly successful statute, and the Supreme Court has been unusually
generous in applying the statute liberally, °6 0 especially to international
disputes in which arbitration subserves important international comity
concerns.'
6'
'" See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 9, at 240-61 (discussing how
courts have evolved principles from statutes); Landis, supra note 11, at 214 ("much of
what is ordinarily regarded as 'common law' finds its source in legislative enactment");
Pound, supra note 11, at 385-86 (arguing that courts must apply the principles inher-
ent in legislation).
15 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
15' See id. § 2; H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) (noting that the
Act aims to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts").
15' See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) (instructing a court in which such a suit is pending to
grant a stay "until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement").
"'0 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (stating
that "we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984) (applying Arbitration Act to state courts); Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (emphasizing the "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration").
'10 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
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There is some tension between the Arbitration Act and a number
of federal statutes. The latter assure federal rights and vest jurisdiction
(sometimes exclusive) in federal courts, while the former suggests that
such statutory rights might be subject to enforceable arbitration agree-
ments. The Court has resolved this tension through a presumption that
federal statutory rights are subject to arbitration unless the party op-
posing arbitration can convincingly show that Congress intended to
limit waivers of a judicial forum or that arbitration is inherently incon-
sistent with the statute's purposes.'62 For statutes that were enacted
before arbitration became a popular and easily enforceable remedy, it is
obviously hard to rebut this presumption. Such was the case in Shear-
sonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 6 ' in which a closely di-
vided Court upheld an agreement to arbitrate anti-fraud claims based
upon Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
There is at least one exception to this strong presumption, which
was applied in a case decided just before Shearson lAmerican Express.
The Court in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Buell... held
that a railway worker injured because the railroad breached its duty to
furnish workers with a safe work place has the option of bringing a
lawsuit pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 65
even though the dispute is also arbitrable under the Railway Labor
Act. The Court justified its decision primarily by reference to prior
Supreme Court decisions holding that workers seeking to enforce spe-
cific statutory rights are not precluded from doing so by the availability
of arbitration schemes. "[T]he theory running through these cases is
that notwithstanding the strong policies encouraging arbitration, 'differ-
ent considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights
arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guar-
antees to individual workers.' ""'e The Court noted the distinct scheme
of statutory rights created by the FELA and invoked the Mancari rule
against repeals by implication.1
6 7
629 (1985) ("concerns of international comity" require the enforcement of international
arbitration agreements); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974)
("A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitra-
tion agreement would . . . invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages.").
"62 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628; Dean Witter Reynolds, 470
U.S. at 221.
163 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
164 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
165 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
168 Buell, 480 U.S. at 565 (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981)).
16 See id. at 566-67.
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b. Strong Presumption of Native American Tribal Autonomy
The Supreme Court in the nineteenth century established the fed-
eral common law rule that Native American reservations were "distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive."1 8 In the twentieth century, this common law
value has been reinforced by a series of federal statutes guaranteeing "a
meaningful Indian self-determination policy."' 69 Although Native
American reservations are not fully independent sovereignties, the stat-
utory and common law value of Native American self-determination
provides a "backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal
statutes must be read"'170 and suggests a presumption that "'[s]tate
laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reser-
vation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws
shall apply.' "'7'
These public values had a decisive impact in several cases decided
in the last two years. In Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,
7 z
the Court interpreted the federal diversity jurisdiction statute as inap-
plicable to a case in which Native Americans were sued based upon
activities transpiring on their reservation; the Court held that the reser-
vation's tribal court should have the first opportunity to exercise juris-
diction over the controversy.' 73 Although neither the diversity statute
nor its legislative history suggests such an exception, the Court placed
heavy emphasis upon the public values presumption: "In the absence of
any indication that Congress intended the diversity statute to limit the
jurisdiction of the tribal courts, we decline [the] invitation to hold that
tribal sovereignty can be impaired ... 2 ' Similarly, in California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 1 5 the Court invalidated state and
local regulation of bingo and other games within a reservation. The
Court relied upon the "congressional goal of Indian self-government,
"'8 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.).
... Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b)
(1982); see New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 n.17 (1983)
(noting the federal government's strong commitment to tribal self-government as em-
bodied in relevant legislation); Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-479
(1982) (stating that Native American tribes have the right to organize themselves, to
join with others on the same reservation, and to promote their common welfare); Indian
Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982 & West Supp. 1988) (delineating the
constitutional rights of Native Americans).
170 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
171 Id. at 170-71 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 845
(1958)).
172 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
13 See id. at 17.
174 Id. at 18.
.75 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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including its 'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and
economic development,"' 76 and invoked specific executive and legisla-
tive encouragement of gaming activities as a way to generate tribal
revenue.
1 7 7
c. Presumption against Implied Tax and Antitrust Exemptions
Two other federal statutory schemes that have stimulated extensive
debate about public values are the federal tax and antitrust statutes.
The central policies of these statutes-raising money for the govern-
ment and prohibiting anticompetitive activity-have been vigorously
enforced by the Court. This enforcement shows up in strong presump-
tions against exemptions from those broad policies. Reflecting "'the felt
indispensable role of antitrust policy in the maintenance of a free econ-
omy,' "178 implied antitrust immunities are disfavored,' 7 9 and estab-
lished statutory exemptions in the antitrust laws are narrowly con-
strued."' Similarly, the Court has recognized the "principle that
exemptions from taxation are not to be implied." ''
This latter presumption was critical to the Court's recent decision
in United States v. Wells Fargo Bank,82 which addressed whether
public housing project notes issued pursuant to the Housing Act of
1937 are exempt from federal estate taxation. Section 5(e) of the Act
provides that such notes "shall be exempt from all taxation now or
18 Id. at 216 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 464 U.S. 324,
334-35 (1983)).
' See id. at 217-19.
178 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963).
19 See National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452
U.S. 378, 388-89 (1981); see also United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975) ("implied antitrust immunity ... can be justified only by
a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regula-
tory system"); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975) ("repeal of
the antitrust laws by implication is not favored and not casually to be allowed");
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561 (1944) ("if ex-
ceptions are to be written into the [Sherman] Act, they must come from the Congress,
not this Court").
180 See, e.g., Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 460
U.S. 150, 156-57 (1983) (holding state purchases for purpose of competing against
private companies outside the statutory exemption of the antitrust laws); Group Life &
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979)-("It is well settled that
exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed.").
1 United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 108 S. Ct. 1179, 1182 (1988); see
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 606 (1943) ("This Court has
repeatedly said that tax exemptions are not granted by implication."); Rapid Transit
Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573, 592 (1938) (affirming New York state court's asser-
tion that "the right to tax cannot be lost by ... tenuous implication").
182 108 S. Ct. 1179 (1988).
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hereafter imposed by the United States."1 ' Notwithstanding the ap-
parent clarity of the statutory language and supportive legislative his-
tory,"" the Court held that such notes are subject to estate taxes but
not to income taxes. 8 The Court's analysis started with the "settled
principle that exemptions from taxation are not to be implied." 86 The
Court then noted the longstanding policy distinction between income
and property taxes and excise taxes, such as estate taxes: "The former
has historically been permitted even where the latter has been constitu-
tionally or statutorily forbidden," such that "on the rare occasions
when Congress has exempted property from estate taxation it has gen-
erally adverted explicitly to that tax, rather than generically to 'all
taxation.' "187
3. Background Context
Wells Fargo illustrates the Court's frequent willingness to derive
general principles from one statute or statutory scheme and apply them
to a separate statute, even when it is quite clear that the first statute is
formally inapplicable.'88 Under a public values analysis, the policy dis-
cussion and experience derived from other statutes is a useful starting
point for discussion for problems arising under more recent statutes.
A classic example of the way in which statutory values can have a
decisive effect as background context is Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection."9 The issue was
whether Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Act190 authorizes a trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state environmen-
tal protection laws. The text of Section 554(a) provides little guidance,
for it simply allows the trustee to "abandon any property of the [bank-
183 42 U.S.C. § 1437i(b) (1982).
1'4 The taxpayers relied upon statements made by Senator Walsh on the floor of
the Senate to the effect that § 5(e) would include estate and gift tax exemption, and
upon the Finance Committee's rejection of the Administration's proposed version of
§ 5(e), which explicitly excluded estate taxes from the exemption. See Wells Fargo,
108 S. Ct. at 1183-84. The Court conceded the accuracy of these facts but refused to
draw enough significance from them to rebut the policy presumption. See id.
185 See id. at 1184.
188 Id. at 1182.
187 Id.
I For other recent examples, see, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537,
1546 (1988) (deriving a definition of "materiality" from a group of criminal statutes
and applying it to a more recent immigration statute); United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 372 n.9 (1988) (noting that although the Arbitra-
tion Act does not apply to workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, the fed-
eral courts have "often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases").
189 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
190 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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rupt] estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequen-
tial value and benefit to the estate." 19' A divided Court relied on consti-
tutional and statutory values to hold the trustee's abandonment powers
subject to state laws protecting the environment and the health and
safety of its citizens. The Court began with the Constitution-based pre-
sumption of deference to state regulation of local matters, which had
been applied by lower courts to the trustee's abandonment powers
before the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1978. "If Congress wishes
to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from nonbankruptcy
law, 'the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or
inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in administering
the estate of the bankrupt.' "192
The constitutional value set the stage for the Court's main line of
analysis, based upon statutory values taken from other parts of the
Bankruptcy Act and from other statutes. The Court first relied on Sec-
tion 959(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, which directs the trustee to "man-
age and operate the property in his possession . . . according to the
requirements of the valid laws of the State."' 93 Although Section
959(b) is not formally applicable to the trustee's abandonment power, it
reflects an underlying public value in the Bankruptcy Act, that reor-
ganization of the debtor's estate must be conducted subject to state
health, safety, and environmental regulations.' The Court found "ad-
ditional support" for its interpretation of the Act in the more recent
federal statutes enacted to regulate the treatment and disposal of solid
wastes.' 95 These statutes suggest a compelling national policy to deal
with solid waste and authorize federal lawsuits to enforce environmen-
tal obligations on polluters, similar to the state lawsuit involved in
Midlantic National Bank. "In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of hazardous
and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume that by enactment of
191 Id.
192 474 U.S. at 501 (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904)).
193 11 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982).
.94 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 505. The Court also relied on the
exception to the automatic stay provision, which "permits the Government to enforce
'nonmonetary' judgments against the debtor's estate" notwithstanding the stay. Id. at
503 (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982)). Although the provision to the auto-
matic stay provision does not formally apply to the trustee's abandonment power, its
underlying policy-which explicitly includes "environmental protection" and "safety"
rules-struck the Court as more broadly significant. See id. at 503-04.
19 See id. 505-06 (discussing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986 & West Supp. 1988)).
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§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned longstanding restrictions on
the common-law abandonment power."' 96
C. Common Law Values
The old meta-rule of statutory interpretation, that statutes in dero-
gation of the common law must be strictly (narrowly) construed, sug-
gests the importance that common law values once had for statutory
interpretation. 197 When most law was judge-made, and statutes were
the exception, these values were paramount. In this age of proliferate
statutory and constitutional values, the old meta-rule has lost much of
its force,"" but the common law exercises a substantial influence on
statutory interpretation in other ways. An updated version of the old
meta-rule is that the common law can be used to fill in statutory gaps,
unless it is inconsistent with the overall statutory policy. Additionally,
the common law is the source for a number of presumptions and clear
statement rules that remain important to statutory interpretation, and
in some cases common law background exerts a decisive influence on
statutory developments.
1. The Common Law Meta-Rule
Every statute has gaps in coverage, and often the gaps relate to
issues for which the common law has developed rules and principles.
The Supreme Court will often use the common law rules as a starting
point for filling in those gaps, in part because it is convenient (the com-
mon law offers a readily accessible body of rules), in part because of
existing private reliance (private parties already are generally familiar
with such rules and are accustomed to following them), and in part
because the common law rules represent public values (they have been
the object of judicial trial-and-error and critical commentary and are,
as a result, thought to represent good policy). For example, in Buell,
the Court recognized that "FELA jurisprudence gleans guidance from
common-law developments"' 99 and held that FELA (like the common
law) provides compensation for emotional distress in some cases. Be-
198 Id. at 506.
197 "No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its
words import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law
which it does not fairly express." Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879).
198 See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (" 'The rule
that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed does not
require such an adherence to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose
or lessen the scope plainly intended to be given to the measure.'" (quoting Jamison v.
Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930))).
199 480 U.S. at 568 (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949)).
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cause the common law itself had not reached a consensus on when emo-
tional injury is compensable, the Court remanded the case for factual
development, so that there could be a "precise application of developing
legal principles to the particular facts at hand."' 00
The Court's invocation of common law principles to fill in gaps
within fairly detailed statutes such as FELA is a regular occurrence,
but the meta-rule is even more critical for several older, generally
worded federal statutes that Congress has substantially left to the courts
to develop. These "common law statutes" include Section 1983 and sev-
eral of the other civil rights measures enacted after the Civil War, the
Sherman Act of 1890, the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws,
and Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. To fill in the details
of these statutes, federal courts routinely look to the common law,
which often serves as a presumptive starting place for interpretation.
The Section 1983 cases illustrate this precept best. The statute
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
20 1
As the legislative history makes clear, the statute was designed to create
a species of tort liability in favor of persons deprived of their federal
constitutional and statutory rights under color of state law. Yet the stat-
ute itself tells us almost nothing about the exact contours of liability,
damages, defenses, and so forth; the legislative history closes only a few
of the gaps. Hence federal courts have often looked to the common law
of tort to fill in these gaps.
On the question of damages a leading case is Carey v. Piphus.20 2
The Court drew from Section 1983's legislative history the proposition
that Section 1983 plaintiffs at the very least ought to be compensated
for their injuries. Nothing in the legislative history, however, elaborated
on what sorts of injuries might be worthy of compensation. Predictably,
the Court turned to the guidance of the common law, which "has devel-
200 Id. at 570.
201 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (derived from Civil Rights Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13).
202 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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oped a set of rules to implement the principle that a person should be
compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal
rights. These rules, defining the elements of damages and the prerequi-
sites for their recovery, provide the appropriate starting point for the
inquiry under § 1983 as well."' 03 Based upon tort law analysis, the
Court held that a damage remedy is available for actual mental and
emotional anguish inflicted by an unlawful denial of procedural due
process. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the defamation
per se concept of presumed damages should be invoked, finding the pre-
sumption "'an oddity of tort law' " and, in any event, not appropriate
for due process injuries.2 4 The Court nonetheless did hold that a Sec-
tion 1983 plaintiff, like a tort plaintiff at common law, is entitled to
nominal damages for the deprivation of an absolute right.20 '
The Piphus methodology has been used to establish other elements
of damages for Section 1983 violations, including punitive damages
(which go beyond the compensation principle supported by the legisla-
tive history).20 6 A similar methodology has been used by the Court to
establish defenses to Section 1983 actions. In Pierson v. Ray2'0 the
Court held that judges cannot be sued under Section 1983 for their
judicial actions. Although the legislative history contains substantial
support for the dissenting opinion's argument that the 1871 Congress
expected judges to be sued, 08 the Court found more persuasive the
strong public value underlying the longstanding common law immunity
for judges-namely, the need to free judges from fear of harassment or
intimidation by losing litigants. 0 ' The Court's cases have developed
this public value in a relatively principled way. On the one hand, the
Court has extended this immunity to protect others, such as prosecutors
and witnesses, who are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of
the criminal process.' ' O On the other hand, the Court has not permit-
ted judicial immunity to insulate the judiciary from lawsuits when the
common law and its rationale have not supported it. Consequently, the
203 Id. at 257-58.
204 Id. at 260-64 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349
(1974)).
20 See id. at 266-67.
200 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38-55 (1983) (exploring common law imposi-
tions of punitive damages); Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1484-88 (discussing Smith).
207 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
208 See id. at 559-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
200 See id. at 553-55.
20 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity); see
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-34 (1983) (witness immunity). But see Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920-23 (1984) (refusing to extend immunity to state public
defenders).
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Court has recently declined to extend immunity to protect judges
against injunction lawsuits,"' or against suits based on a judge's ad-
ministrative, ministerial (as opposed to judicial) activities.2"2
The most interesting recent case in this line is Town of Newton v.
Rumery,2"' which addressed the question of whether federal courts will
enforce a criminal defendant's waiver of her Section 1983 claims, in
return for the prosecutor's agreement to dismiss pending-and argua-
bly unfounded-criminal charges. A majority of the Court resolved the
issue "by reference to traditional common-law principles, as we have
resolved other questions about the principles governing § 1983 ac-
tions."214 Contract law suggested that a promise is unenforceable only
if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed by a contrary public
policy. The majority found no such policy in this case, although Justice
O'Connor (concurring in part and in the judgment) appeared willing to
do so in other cases.21 ' The dissenting Justices would have created out
of Section 1983 "a strong presumption against the enforceability of
such agreements."21 6 The debate within the Court in Rumery articu-
lates constitutional, statutory, and common law values and is a model of
a good public values dialogue.
Obviously, Section 1983 has resulted in an unusual amount of
gapfilling based upon common law values, because it is a much-liti-
gated statute, has a statutory text and legislative history that answer
very few interpretive questions, and is directly analogous to an arena of
vast common law experience (torts). But the Court has relied on the
principles of the common law to fill gaps in the other common law
statutes as well, including the Sherman Act of 1890,217 the anti-fraud
211 See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 528-42 (1984).
212 See Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 543-45 (1988).
213 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
214 Id. at 392.
2115 See id. at 399-403 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)
(suggesting that a case-by-case approach to these bargains is preferable to a per se rule
holding them always in accord with public policy).
211 Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217 See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556, 565-74 (1982) (using common law agency principles to hold petitioner civilly
liable for antitrust violations that its agents committed with apparent authority); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434-46 (1978) (invoking common
law intent principles to hold that a defendant's state of mind is an element of a criminal
antitrust offense, hence must be affirmatively proven and not taken from the trier of
fact through reliance on a legal presumption). But see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-46 (1981) (refusing to apply a common law right of
contribution to antitrust co-conspirators, on grounds that judicial power to use common




provisions of the securities laws,21 Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947,219 the wire and mail fraud statutes,220 and various jurisdic-
tional and procedural statutes.221
2. Presumptions & Clear Statement Rules
Many specific policy presumptions and clear statement rules have
some origin in the common law; only three groups of such rules will be
explored here. One group of rules, protecting sovereign immunity, is of
almost pure common law origin. The other rules, construing public
grants narrowly and construing anti-attachment statutes to preserve
family support obligations, are inspired by the common law, but also
have constitutional underpinnings.
a. Presumption against Waiver of Governmental Immunities
At common law, the sovereign could not be sued without its con-
sent. This common law policy has been relaxed considerably in the
twentieth century, mainly by statutes waiving sovereign immunity and
by exceptions to common law immunity that apply to sovereigns acting
218 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 988-92 (1988) (employing
common law fraud-on-market theory to presume reliance on corporation's misrepresen-
tations, thus relieving proof problems faced by plaintiffs suing under Rule 10(b)(5));
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-30 (1980) (concluding, from common law
agency and fiduciary principles, that one who obtained merger information through his
work as a printer3of corporate takeover documents had no Rule 10(b)(5) duty to dis-
close that information when buying securities); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063
(1988) (holding that common law in pari delicto defense is available to defendants in
Section 12(1) actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933); TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445-50 (1976) (using the common law materiality
test-whether a reasonable investor would attach importance to the fact misrepre-
sented-in a Rule 14(a)(9) action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
219 See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 373-
74 (1987) (analyzing common law contract doctrine nullifying agreements that are con-
trary to public policy and refusing to apply it to an arbitration award); Carbon Fuel
Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212, 216-18 (1979) (unions liable for breach of contract only
where the union is responsible according to the common law rule of agency).
220 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320-22 (1987) (drawing
on common law property, fiduciary, and agency principles to bring petitioners, who
bought stock using confidential information developed for publication in future finan-
cial newspaper columns, within the reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes); Mc-
Nally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879-81 (finding the common law of fraud traditionally protected
only property rights, not the intangible rights to honest government).
221 See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988) (common
meaning of "embargo" does not include government-aided exclusion of goods from
market by a trademark owner, thus placing jurisdiction of issue in district court not
Court of International Trade); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 616-
22 (1988) (using common law jurisdictional principles to decide that a case properly
removed to federal court could be remanded to state court where federal law claim has
been eliminated and only pendent state law claims remain).
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in a private or commercial capacity. The policy still survives, however,
due in part to the formalism that the sovereign is not subject to suit in
its own courts without consent, but also in part to our desire not to
squander collective resources in litigation and our faith that most of the
sovereign's errors can be corrected politically. Whatever the values im-
plicit in common law sovereign immunity, they thrive today in the form
of clear statement rules for interpreting statutes. Because "the United
States, as sovereign, 'is immune from suit save as it consents to be
sued,' "222 a waiver of the sovereign's immunity in a statute is effective
only when "unequivocally expressed." '2 23 Additionally, "limitations and
conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be
strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied."2 24 Fi-
nally, there is no right of jury trial against the sovereign, unless it is
clearly and explicitly provided in a statute.22 5
Several of the Court's recent decisions reflect the rule against dero-
gation of sovereignty. In Library of Congress v. Shaw,22 the Court
held that Congress' waiver of federal agencies' sovereign immunity in
Title VII did not encompass awards of interest on monetary judgments.
"In the absence of express congressional consent to the award of inter-
est separate from a general waiver of immunity to suit, the United
States is immune from an interest award," the Court concluded. "This
requirement of a separate waiver reflects the [common law] view that
interest is an element of damages separate from damages on the sub-
stantive claim."2 2 Similarly, in United States v. Johnson2 2 a closely
divided Court interpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)22 9 as
222 United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
22 United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v.
King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
124 Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957) (citing Sherwood, 312 U.S.
at 590-91); see United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979) ("We should not
take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.").
"I See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 162 n.9 (1981) ("Since there is no
generally applicable jury trial right that attaches when the United States consents to
suit, the accepted principles of sovereign immunity require that a jury trial right be
clearly provided in the legislation creating the cause of action.").
228 478 U.S. 310 (1986).
27 Id. at 314 (citation omitted). But cf. Loeffler v. Frank, 108 S. Ct. 1965, 1969,
1974 (1988) (holding the Postal Service susceptible to prejudgment interest in Title VII
cases, because the presumption favors prejudgment interest "when Congress launche[s]
a governmental agency into the commercial world" and authorizes it to "sue and be
sued" (quoting FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940))).
228 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
229 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (waiving sovereign immunity and rendering the




generally inapplicable to torts incident to the victim's service in the
armed forces.230 The debate within the Court concentrated on the co-
gency of the policy rationales for a broad immunity for armed-service-
related injuries. And in United States v. James231 the Court expan-
sively applied the immunity provision of the Flood Control Act2 32 to
insulate the United States from an otherwise meritorious FTCA law-
suit.23 3 In all of these cases, the plain language of the statutes confer-
ring jurisdiction over claims against the government and ordinary tort
policy would support results contrary to the Court's. These decisions
demonstrate that the clear statement rules on immunity rank high
among the canons of statutory interpretation.
b. Narrow Construction of Public Grants
Related to the immunity clear statement rules is the rule narrowly
construing public grants. That is, when grants of federal lands are at
issue, any doubts "'are resolved for the Government, not against
it.' ',234 When the public grant was made in return for valuable consid-
eration (for instance, the land grants given in return for construction of
the transcontinental railroad in the 1860s), however, the strict rule will
not necessarily be applied.2 5 The public values inherent in this rule of
interpretation rest upon our desire that collective rights and property
not be lost through official inadvertence or mistake and on our percep-
tion that as our bargaining agent the government is apt to be marsh-
mallow soft. Although rooted in the common law, the rule construing
public grants narrowly in some cases also possesses constitutional
dimensions.
The issue in Utah Division of State Lands v. United States"'6 was
230 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692. Johnson reaffirmed and expanded Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), which had created the military affairs exception.
See also United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3063 (1987) (expanding Feres prin-
ciple to preclude damage claims based on constitutional violations). The Court has
grudgingly applied the FTCA's exceptions to sovereign immunity, see, e.g., United
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (Feres doctrine bars claim against govern-
ment based on negligent supervision of soldier who killed another soldier off-duty and
off base); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 862 (1984) (affirming that claims
involving damage to goods obtained by customs officers could not be brought under the
FTCA), except when the text of the Act seems to require it. See Sheridan v. United
States, 108 S. Ct. 2449, 2453-56 (1988).
231 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
2.2 33 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
23 See James, 478 U.S. at 606-12.
2' Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978) (quoting
United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957)).
' See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 677-88 (1979).
236 107 S. Ct. 2318 (1987).
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whether an 1889 administrative decision, pursuant to statute, reserving
Utah Lake as a future reservoir site and closing it to private settlement
meant that Utah did not acquire title to the lakebed when it achieved
statehood.2"7 The issue encompassed two questions, one turning upon
common law values and the other upon constitutional values. The first
question was whether there had been a pre-statehood conveyance of
rights. The Court started with " 'a strong presumption against convey-
ance by the United States' " and refused to "'infer such a conveyance
unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very
plain, or was rendered in clear and especial words.' "23 The Court
noted that in only one case had it found such a statutory conveyance
and declined to find the "reservation" of the lake to be a conveyance.
Secondly, the Court held that in the case of a reservation, Utah would
still succeed to the federal rights at statehood unless Congress showed
intent to abrogate the rights of the new state, which it found Congress
did not do."39
c. Presumption that Common Law Family Obligations Are Not Dis-
placed by Anti-Attachment Statutes
An important common law obligation is that of the family bread-
winner to support the rest of the family; upon divorce or separation this
obligation may be formalized in a support decree. These obligations can
be enforced at the state level against the breadwinner's government en-
titlements and other assets, despite state statutes generally protecting
them from attachment by ordinary creditors. The Supreme Court has
at times adopted a similar approach to federal anti-attachment statutes:
"Unless positively required by direct enactment the courts should not
presume a design upon the part of Congress in relieving the unfortu-
nate debtor to make the law a means of avoiding enforcement of the
obligation, moral and legal, devolved upon the [supporting spouse] to
support [the remainder of the family]." 24
"' Under the constitutional "equal footing" doctrine, a new state automatically
succeeds to the lands underlying navigable waters unless Congress had made an express
pre-statehood conveyance of the property. Id. at 2320-21.
238 Id. at 2321 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981)).
239 See id. at 2321, 2326-27.
2. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904); see Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d
583, 586 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that "the exception from discharge for alimony and
payments for maintenance and support has long been an accepted part of bankruptcy
law"); Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (allowing assignment
of disability insurance because "[flor the head of a family, the essentials of sustenance
for his dependents remain 'necessaries' as much when he is disabled as when he is well
and employed"); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (creat-
ing an exception to ERISA's anti-assignment and anti-alienation provisions on the
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The Supreme Court addressed the common law exception to anti-
attachment statutes again in 1987. Rose v. Rose24x posed the question
whether a state court may hold a disabled veteran in contempt for fail-
ure to pay child support, when he could satisfy the obligation only by
using Veterans' Administration (VA) benefits protected by federal law
from alienation or attachment. The federal anti-attachment provision
provides that "[p]ayments of benefits . . . under any law administered
by the Veterans' Administration ... made to, or on account of, a bene-
ficiary . . . shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or
under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after
receipt by the beneficiary."242 A majority of the Court found the provi-
sion inapplicable,2 43 based upon the purposive whole act rule. The
anti-attachment provision aims to avoid the possibility of the VA be-
coming a collection agency and to "prevent the deprivation and deple-
tion of the means of subsistence of veterans dependent upon these bene-
fits as the main source of their income. '2 4 4 The former purpose would
in no way be impaired by state court orders entered against the veteran.
Nor would the later purpose, the Court argued, because VA benefits
are the means by which the government assures "'reasonable and ade-
quate compensation for disabled veterans and their families.' "245 Since
a primary public value implicated in the anti-attachment provision is
protection of the veteran's family, it is not inconsistent to infer an ex-
ception for support obligations.246 I find this argument generally per-
suasive, though it invites the response that the statute aims to protect
primarily the veteran and not the family as a whole. If we must decide
who should get the benefits, the statutory purpose arguably gives us no
reason not to prefer the veteran, who after all was injured in military
duty, over other members of the family.
2 47
ground that failure to do so would "erode the statutory and common law policy of
protecting the security of family dependents"). But see Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S.
46 (1981) (no implied exemption for support obligations in anti-attachment provision
of Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act).
241 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
242 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
243 See Rose, 481 U.S. at 630-34 (opinion for the Court by Marshall, J., joined on
this issue by Rehnquist, C.J., and Brennan, Blackmun & Powell, JJ.).
244 S. REP. No. 1243, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 148, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5241, 5369-70.
245 Rose, 481 U.S. at 630 (quoting S. REP. No. 604, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4479, 4488) (emphasis added
by the Court)).
246 See id. at 630-32.
247 See id. at 642-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (questioning whether "depriving a veteran of benefits in favor of his children
does not conflict with the statute's purpose").
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The more persuasive public values argument in this case was
made by Justice O'Connor. Joined by Justice Stevens, she concurred in
the majority's conclusion that the state court order was not preempted.
However, she provided a reason the statute should permit a preference
for family members over the veteran. Her opinion began by invoking
the "special sanctity" the Anglo-American tradition affords the support
obligation.248 She then argued that orders to support one's family have
traditionally been considered analytically distinct from orders to pay
one's external debts and that our nation's values appear to give priority
to the former in accordance with public concern for the security of vul-
nerable family members. Crucial to her argument was "the fact that
the common law generally will not enforce similar anti-attachment pro-
visions against a family member's claim for support." '249 Given "this
Nation's common law tradition" and the generality of the federal stat-
ute's anti-attachment language-which apparently was aimed at tradi-
tional creditors and not family members-Justices O'Connor and Ste-
vens read an exception into the statute for support obligations.
3. Background Context
Like statutory and constitutional values, common law values some-
times provide critical background arguments in statutory cases.250 One
good example of this phenomenon is the influence of the common law
"American rule" against requiring losing litigants to pay the fees of
opposing counsel. The leading case on this rule, Alyeska Pipeline Co. v.
Wilderness Society,25 interpreted a series of federal statutes" 2 as re-
quiring that "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser,"2 3 absent explicit statutory
authorization.25 4
248 Id. at 637 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
249 Id. at 638.
250 Of particular importance is the line of cases flowing from Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), which disapprove federal court exercise of statutory jurisdiction in
cases that would violate "the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin
pending state court proceedings," id. at 41, a policy grounded upon traditional equity
jurisdiction as well as constitutional federalism. See id. at 43-44; see, e.g., Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (holding, in a multi-billion-dollar case, that
application of the Younger doctrine is mandated "if the State's interests in the proceed-
ing are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the
comity between the States and the National Government").
251 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
2M2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 & 1923 (1982).
292 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.
254 See id. at 266-67 & n.40 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)). Alyeska's scope has
since been partially limited in that it no longer governs civil rights litigation. The Civil
Rights Attorney Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), "reinvested the judiciary
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In Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,2"5 the Court interpreted one of the
specific statutory authorizations adverted to in Alyeska, namely, Section
307(f) of the Clean Air Act. It provides: "In any judicial proceeding
under this section, the court may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it determines
that such award is appropriate."2 5 Notwithstanding the broad authori-
zation of the statutory language and specific support in the House com-
mittee report for awarding counsel fees to nonprevailing parties,257 a
divided Court held that a party must enjoy some success on the merits
in order to obtain counsel fees. 58 The Court's analysis started by stat-
ing the American rule and then noted that "virtually every one of the
more than 150 existing federal fee-shifting provisions predicates fee
awards on some success by the claimant." '259 From these common law
and statutory principles, the Court distilled a public value that a suc-
cessful party need not pay counsel fees: "Before we will conclude Con-
gress abandoned this established principle that a successful party need
not pay its unsuccessful adversary's fees-rooted as it is in intuitive
notions of fairness and widely manifested in numerous different con-
texts-a clear showing that this result was intended is required."26
The Court also invoked the public value of narrowly construing waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity, relevant because the United States was the
defendant in this case.
261
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC VALUES IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Our experience with public values in statutory interpretation sug-
gests that such values are not limited to those arising out of the Consti-
tution nor to those constitutional values that are operative only to strike
with the discretion to grant attorneys' fees in civil rights cases." Shadis v. Beal, 685
F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464, 465
(9th Cir. 1977) (holding that the passage of the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Award Act
"restored pre-Alyeska law" to civil rights litigation), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S.
547 (1978).
255 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
266 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0 (1982).
'" See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 689-91 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1977), which expressed the committee's intent that the court's
authority to award attorney's fees under this bill not be limited to "cases in which the
party seeking fees was the 'prevailing party' ").
258 See id. at 694.
2'59 Id. at 684. Conversely, one can argue that when Congress meant for fees to be
available only to the prevailing party, it knew how to say so. Its choice of more open-
ended language in § 307(0 then suggests greater liberality.
260 Id. at 685.
61 See id. at 685-86.
1989]
1062 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
down statutes. It may be that constitutional values can be most useful
as interpretational filters (clear statement rules, policy presumptions,
gapfilling principles, background context) and that statutory and com-
mon law values are just as important as constitutional values in discov-
ering our nation's public virtue. At the very least, the analysis in Part
II suggests that public values analysis can be an illuminating way of
looking at many of the Court's statutory interpretation decisions. Just
as public values analysis helps us evaluate these cases, though, these
cases provide an interesting laboratory for evaluating the cogency and
legitimacy of public values analysis. In this Part, I shall evaluate the
cases described in Part II, and suggest the major problems with public
values analysis taken as a whole. In my view, the most controversial of
the public values decisions-Weber, Johnson, Bob Jones, and Dames &
Moore-were correctly decided, while several of the more obscure deci-
sions-Catholic Bishop, Shearson lAmerican Express, McNally, Ruck-
elshaus, Welch, Rumery, and others described in this Part-were
wrongly decided.
As a scholar who finds public values analysis attractive, I am sur-
prised at how much I disagree with the Supreme Court's use of it. Part
III explores this quandary in connection with the three main critical
tests that face public values analysis in statutory interpretation cases: Is
the analysis consistent with the overriding constitutional commitment to
legislative supremacy? I believe so, but must note one important excep-
tion. The principle of legislative supremacy suggests that public values
ought not be able to displace the apparent meaning of a clear statutory
text which is reinforced by similarly clear legislative history.262 Is a
public values approach a determinate or coherent approach to statutory
interpretation? As deployed by the current Court it is not, and I am not
optimistic that another group of nine Justices would do the analysis
any more" consistently or coherently. The upshot of this criticism is that
the Justices have a great range of value choices to make under public
values analysis, and that in turn raises a third question. Can the Court
justify its value choices in all these cases? No. My analysis of the recent
cases suggests that the Court's overall set of public values is biased in
ways that are hard to justify.
A. Public Values & Legislative Supremacy
If constitutional law scholarship is any guide, the obvious objection
to public values analysis is the "countermajoritarian difficulty." In a
22 See D. Farber, Legislative Supremacy & Statutory Interpretation 19 (draft
Aug. 1988) ("[W]hen legislation clearly embodies a collective legislative understanding,
the court must give way even if its own view of public policy is quite different.").
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representative democracy, unelected judges should be leery of substitut-
ing their values for those put into a statute by Congress, which under
the Constitution has supreme lawmaking authority.26 While legislative
supremacy is an axiom of our constitutional separation of powers, and
public values analysis does call upon the Court to read beyond the four
corners of the legislative product, the analysis is not necessarily in di-
rect conflict with legislative supremacy. Consider the following range of
cases.
1. Open-Textured Statutes
Frequently the Court has no choice but to go beyond the four cor-
ners of the statute and its legislative history to answer an interpretive
question, because the statute's open texture (the open-endedness of the
statutory language and indeterminacy of legislative history) forecloses
determinate answers and makes judicial policymaking inevitable. In-
deed, in many instances Congress' enactment of an open-textured stat-
ute may constitute an implicit legislative delegation of lawmaking au-
thority to the Court.264 Examples include the common law statutes
discussed above 265-the FELA (Buell), Section 1983 (Carey v. Piphus
and Pierson), and the Sherman Act.2"6 In interpreting such statutes,
the Court's reliance on common law precepts to fill in the details of the
open text is not only consistent with, but positively obedient to, legisla-
tive supremacy.
Other statutes include an open-textured mandate for agencies
(rather than the Court) to develop the statutory policies over time.
These statutes traditionally have been analyzed as delegations of law-
making authority to agencies. The Court's meta-rule of deference to
26s On the countermajoritarian difficulty, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER-
OUS BRANCH 16 (1962). Cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 (1980) (stating
that countermajoritarian difficulty is not so important in statutory and common law
cases, because judicial decisions are "subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary
statute.").
264 For the now-classic statement of this argument in the constitutional context,
see J. ELY, supra note 263. See also R. POSNER, supra note 48, at 286-93 (1985)
("common law statutes" invite judicial gapfilling as part of process of statutory
interpretation).
265 See supra notes 199-221 and accompanying text.
266 "The changing content of the term 'restraint of trade' was well recognized at
the time the Sherman Act was enacted," Justice Scalia (a Justice unusually concerned
with legislative supremacy) wrote for the Court last Term. "The Sherman Act adopted
the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common
law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the
term in 1890." Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515,
1523 (1988).
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coherent and rational agency interpretations is consistent with legisla-
tive supremacy when it ratifies agency interpretations not inconsistent
with the statute.28 7 There is a debate within the Court whether this
meta-rule requires very much rationality from agencies;168 I agree with
the formulation in Cardoza-Fonseca that the agency's interpretation is
itself subject to public values scrutiny. This position is consistent with
legislative supremacy, insofar as we can presume that Congress' delega-
tion of lawmaking power to the agency is generally subject to a reason-
ableness requirement.
Even where the statute as a whole is not a broad delegation to
courts or agencies to fill in policy details, the statute will typically con-
tain many ambiguities, because Congress either did not anticipate all
the problems that would arise, or anticipated them and could not reach
consensus about how to respond. For these "open issues," the Court's
public values analysis seems appropriate. The purposive whole act
meta-rule and a number of the clear statement rules are ways in which
the Court permits an ambiguous statute to address new situations not
anticipated by the Congress that drafted the statute (Weber, Guerra,
and Johnson).
2. Conflicting & Weakened Legislative Signals
Sometimes, rather than providing too little policy guidance, Con-
gress provides too much guidance, pushing the Court in different direc-
tions. In these cases, there is no way the Court can avoid compromising
one or more statutory policies, and the use of public values analysis to
make these hard choices is consistent with legislative supremacy. For
example, Congress sometimes enacts a statute that on its face clashes
with earlier enactments. The Court's narrowing interpretation to avoid
implicit, unintended repeals subserves rather than undermines legisla-
tive supremacy (Mancari).
The harder cases are those in which Congress apparently adopted
one policy in an early statute, and then retreated from that policy in
later statutes without amending or repealing their antecedent. Through
the statute-based clear statement rules, the Court updates and harmo-
2817 See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 280-86 (1987).
288 Compare NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,
108 S. Ct. 413, 421 (1988) (on a pure issue of statutory interpretation, the Court will
enforce legislative intent, using traditional methods, and will apply reasonable agency
view if statute is ambiguous) with id. at 426 (Scalia, J., concurring) (urging broader
deference to agency interpretations). See also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct.
1811, 1817 (1988) ("If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue addressed by the regulation, the question becomes whether the agency regulation
is a permissible construction of the statute." (citations omitted)).
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nizes statutory policy based upon evolving legislative and judicial devel-
opments (Wells Fargo and Shearson/American Express). Although
these public value cases may be in some tension with earlier legislative
expectations, they do not violate the precept of legislative supremacy;
they merely make the reasonable assumption that where Congress has
not clearly said otherwise, it wants its ongoing policies effected. For
example, Midlantic National Bank arguably subserves legislative
supremacy because it recognizes and articulates recent statutory policies
and applies those policies to a statutory scheme in which Congress had
not focused on environmental issues.
3. Bending Statutes to Reflect Common Law & Constitutional
Policies
Concerns of legislative supremacy are greatest in those cases where
the Supreme Court bends a statutory text based upon a constitutional
or common law value; often that bending process displaces an apparent
expectation of the enacting Congress. While there is tension in these
cases between public values and legislative supremacy, the tension
should not be exaggerated. Recall that the background rules and pre-
sumptions are generally subject to clear statements of contrary legisla-
tive expectations. Hence, if the text and legislative history support one
interpretation, public values analysis cannot displace it. In many cases,
the public values presumptions operate as "tiebreakers" in the close
cases, where there are good textual and legislative history arguments
for different interpretations.
A clear statement rule might tip the scales in a case where, absent
the rule, the interpreter would say that it is slightly more probable
(55% to 45%) that Congress intended the other interpretation. Rose v.
Rose may be such a case, where the breadth of the statutory language
and the ambivalence of the legislative purpose could easily have sup-
ported denying pension benefits to the dependents, but the common law
value tipped the scales toward the other interpretation (for at least two
Justices). This result is not strikingly contrary to legislative
supremacy,2"9 for the Anglo-American legal tradition has employed
clear statement rules for as long as it has done statutory interpretation.
Indeed, most of these clear statement rules and presumptions are long-
standing doctrines of which Congress ought to be aware. Not only can
Congress overrule an erroneous public values interpretation of a stat-
29 Cf Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv.
423, 461-65 (1988) (where legislative history does not yield clear-cut answers, current
policy considerations should be decisive).
1066 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 137:1007
ute, but it is on notice when it writes statutes that these principles will
be applied."'
While public values can readily be defended in those close cases
where the text and legislative history are ambiguous, their invocation to
trump a clear text and supportive legislative history would be inconsis-
tent with legislative supremacy. The most controversial public values
decisions are those where the result "rewrites" the statute and negates
clearly expressed legislative expectations that have not been undone by
substantially changed circumstances. One case in which that charge
seems justified is Catholic Bishop. The NLRA's definition of covered
"employers" is quite broad enough to embrace religiously affiliated
educational institutions, and Congress listed eight exceptions to the cov-
erage, none of which even arguably applied.2"' Congress would have
been hard put to have drafted the statute more comprehensively. More-
over, the statute's history strongly suggests that Congress actually in-
tended to include religiously affiliated educational institutions. The
NLRB interpreted the Act to apply to charitable employers in 1942,
and in 1947 the House-Senate conference committee for the Taft-Hart-
ley amendments to the NLRA rejected the House proposal to exclude
charitable institutions from the definition of "employer."2 2 The 1947
amendment did, however, add an exception solely for charitable hospi-
tals." 3 Even that was deleted by Congress when it amended the NLRA
in 1974, and the legislative history of the 1974 amendments suggests
Congress assumed that the Act applied to religiously affiliated
institutionsY.1
4
Catholic Bishop is inconsistent with legislative supremacy, and for
that reason I believe that the case was wrongly decided. The same can
270 Cf. United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668, 680-81 n.9 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (repeals should be inferred only when an earlier and a subsequent statute
cannot be reconciled, in order to avoid changing "the legal landscape against which
Congress works").
271 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (defining "employer" as "any person acting as
an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States
or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any
State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act,
as amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organiza-
tion." (emphasis added and citation omitted)).
272 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 511-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
273 Id. at 513-14.
274 Senator Ervin proposed an amendment to preserve the exemption for relig-
iously affiliated hospitals. See 120 CONG. REC. 12950, 12967-68 (1974). The amend-
ment was defeated, and during the debate the floor manager of the bill based his argu-
ment against the amendment upon "the existing national policy which holds religiously
affiliated institutions generally[,] such as . . .educational facilities[,] to the same stan-
dards as their nonsectarian counterparts." Id. at 12957 (statement of Sen. Cranston).
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be said of Ruckelshaus"' But I do not think that any other case dis-
cussed in Part II is so inconsistent with legislative supremacy that it is,
for that reason alone, an illegitimate decision. To illustrate and develop
my position, I shall contrast the public values approach to Title VII in
Weber and Johnson with the approach taken by the dissenting
justices.
Weber is a classic example of public values in statutory interpreta-
tion, because the Court explicitly drew upon the statutory purpose and
evolution to broaden the statute's concerns and implicitly relied upon
the constitutional debate over corrective preferences. The dissent in
Weber claimed that the result is deeply inconsistent with legislative
supremacy, because it negates the original legislative deal clearly evi-
denced by the text and background of the statute.2 77 I have argued the
correctness of Weber in prior publications,2 78 but in brief there are
three reasons why I consider Weber to be a legitimate decision, not-
withstanding the powerful case built by the dissenting opinion.
To begin with, the evidence of legislative expectations is not so
strong as it was in Catholic Bishop, where an inclusive text and re-
peated legislative consideration undercut the Court's public values in-
quiry. The text interpreted in Weber forbade "discriminat[ion], ' ' 79 a
relatively open-textured term that is nowhere defined in the statute,
and a term with many different connotative meanings. The legislative
discussion in 1964 certainly evidenced a hostility to government-im-
posed employment "quotas,"28  but the precise issue of voluntary af-
firmative action was not prominently discussed. More important, Title
VII has since 1964 evolved in ways that undercut the cogency of any
original legislative understanding about voluntary affirmative action. If
Congress had been asked in 1964 whether voluntary affirmative action
were permissible, it might well have said no, in order to effectuate
color-blindness values. If it had been asked the same question in 1972,
276 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 695-706 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (demonstrating that the text and, especially, the legislative history cut
sharply against the Court's public values result).
276 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented in Weber. See United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 219
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia dis-
sented in Johnson. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 219-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Meltzer, The
Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employ-
ment, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 423, 444-47 (1980); D. Farber, supra note 262, at 34-39.
278 See Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1488-94; W. Eskridge & P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning (Apr. 1989 draft).
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (d) (1982).
260 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 231-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19891
1068 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
it might have answered differently, because by then both the Court2"'
and Congress2 2 had recognized that formally color blind decisions were
not solving the problem of exclusion of blacks from the workforce, ap-
parently due to continuing effects of past discrimination and covert dis-
crimination. Finally, by 1979, our legal culture had developed, in the
constitutional arena especially, a sophisticated understanding of the am-
biguities of discrimination and the greater difficulty faced in solving the
country's racial problems. To insist that the Court ignore this uniquely
public discussion and instead to recreate the answer that would have
been given in 1964 strikes me as bizarre.
These public values arguments were considered and rejected by
the two Justices dissenting in Weber and the three Justices dissenting
in Johnson. Their disagreement goes beyond the technical issues (such
as the meaning of discrimination or of the 1964 debates) and represents
a fundamental disagreement about the role of public values in statutory
interpretation. The dissenters' position can be considered a substan-
tially more "nominalist" approach to statutory interpretation. Starting
from the precept of legislative supremacy, the statutory nominalist ar-
gues that the only legitimate interpretation is the one that is a logical
deduction from the authoritative statements of the original legislative
mandate."8 ' Generally, the nominalist approach differs from the ap-
proach I have taken in defending Weber in its greater reluctance to
281 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426-36 (1971) (holding illegal
under Title VII as discriminatory an employer's requirements of a high school diploma
and a certain aptitude test score, because, although applied in a color-blind fashion,
they had a discriminatory effect with no demonstrated relationship between the re-
quirements and successful job performance).
282 When it amended Title VII in 1972, both House and Senate committee re-
ports approved the Court's greater emphasis on results. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 20-22 (1972) ("The provisions of the bill are fully in accord with the
decision of the Court [in Griggs]."); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1972)
(noting that while in 1964 discrimination "tended to be viewed as a series of isolated
... events," it had by 1972 come to be recognized as a problem within the system
needing system-wide solutions).
28. The primary Weber dissent, written by Justice Rehnquist, emphasized original
legislative intent, while the primary Johnson dissent, written by Justice Scalia, empha-
sized the statutory text. These represent two somewhat different analyses. While Jus-
tice Rehnquist considers both text and legislative history binding on the Court, Justice
Scalia only considers the text binding. See Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-
51 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (refusing to follow one committee report purporting to interpret
language, which that committee had not drafted, where 12 of 13 circuits had inter-
preted the language to reach the opposite result). Compare Weber, 443 U.S. at 219-55
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that Title VII's legislative history made its mean-
ing clear) with United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2424 (1988) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part) ("[I]t must be assumed that what Members of [Congress] thought they
were voting for, and what the President thought he was approving when he signed the
bill, was what the text plainly said, rather than what a few Representatives, or even a
Committee Report, said it said.").
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bend statutes to reflect common law or constitutional values and in its
refusal to draw general principles from specific statutes.2"4
Statutory nominalism is related to a formalist theory of the judicial
role, in which judicial "choices" are narrowly limited by the directions
provided judges by the legislature (the statutory text and/or the legisla-
tive history).28 5 But statutory nominalists have not, to my knowledge,
presented us with a persuasive theory supporting their version of for-
malism.2"' (Such a theory would be necessary to displace decades of
Supreme Court reliance on public values in at least some cases.) As I
have argued above, it will not do for nominalists simply to invoke legis-
lative supremacy, for most public values analysis is consistent with leg-
islative supremacy. As best I can discern, statutory nominalists ulti-
mately ground their approach to statutory interpretation upon a special
claim about what legislative supremacy means: It means enforcing the
specific historical "deal" reached in the legislative process; because the
deal is evidenced by the statutory text (Scalia) and the legislative his-
tory (Rehnquist), judges as contract enforcers must adhere closely to
the answers suggested by the specific materials. Ergo, they must not
enlarge upon or constrict the deal by reference to values "outside" that
deal.287
To the extent that statutory nominalists are concerned primarily
with preserving the precise contours of legislative deals, it appears that
their major normative inspiration is pluralist political theory. A plural-
ist views government as a means to resolve interest group clashes and
views legislation as typically a "deal" between legislators and interest
groups. The goal of the pluralist system is not to surpass, but to sur-
vive; not to produce optimally rational, public-seeking statutes, but to
keep the political game rolling along so as to foster social moderation
and stability.
264 These generalizations are inspired by Justice Scalia's positions in statutory
cases, see infra note 319, by the early work of Judge Posner, see R. POSNER, supra
note 48 at 285-93; Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817-22 (1983), and by the work of Judge Easter-
brook, see Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1984).
285 For more interesting explorations of formalism than those presented here, see
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986-87); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE
L.J. 509 (1988).
288 And Judge Posner, who is something of a nominalist, see supra note 284,
rejects formalism. See Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 827
(1988); Posner, supra note 285.
27 See sources cited supra note 284; see also Landes & Posner, The Independent
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875, 894 (1975)
(describing the political process as a struggle between interest groups with the judiciary
set apart, not to make value judgments, but to enforce the "deals").
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Accepting purely pluralist governmental theory admittedly would
make public values interpretation highly questionable in any case
where the statutory text and/or legislative history suggest a contrary
answer.2"' But do statutory nominalists have a persuasive normative
argument for their pluralist vision of politics? Some pluralists ground
their position upon the original design of the United States Constitution
to create a "liberal" polity; yet this view of our constitutional history
has become increasingly controversial.2"9 It is apparent that our consti-
tutional history contains elements that derive both from the republican,
public values tradition and from the liberal, pluralist tradition."'
Other pluralists ground their position upon a gritty realism about poli-
tics, arguing that it rarely rises above the level of dealmaking. Theirs
tends to be more a positive than a normative argument, and in any
event its descriptive power has been cogently questioned by modern
scholarship suggesting that public values do play a critical role in
politics.29'
Not only have the traditional arguments for pluralism lost much of
their force, but there are strong reasons for us to prefer a political vi-
sion which encourages the development and application of public val-
ues. At a very simple level, it is a more appealing vision of, or aspira-
tion for, our polity. This idea is suggested by Dworkin's distinction
between a rulebook community and a community of principle.292 In a
rulebook community, people are bonded by their commitment to follow-
ing the rules established through a self-interested but fair bargaining
process; the rules don't have to embody anything more than a special
288 Pure pluralism, in other words, frowns on public values interpretation of stat-
utes that are not truly open-textured. Such pluralist theory runs prominently through
the work of Judge Posner, who is very skeptical of many of the clear statement rules
and meta-rules, see Posner, supra note 284, at 805-17 (rejecting most canons of statu-
tory construction), of judicial efforts to impute rational goals and purposes to Congress,
see R. POSNER, supra note 48, at 285-93, and of judicial expansions of statutes beyond
their formal boundaries, see Posner, supra note 285. Note, however, that Judge Pos-
ner's later work is moving away from the nominalist and deal-seeking perspective of his
earlier pieces. See Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline. 1962-
1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 774-77 (1987).
289 Leading legal essays discussing the historical debate are Ackerman, supra note
1, at 1013-23, 1051-70; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 1, at 45-48.
290 See generally Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 1, at 1558-64, 1576-89 (discussing
the republican role in American constitutional tradition and its implications for present
political practice).
2"' For leading works in this area, see S. KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A
HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987); J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, AL-
TERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984); A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON
GOOD (1983).
282 See R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 208-15.
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compromise for us to obey them. In a community of principle, citizens
accept that they are bonded by common principles, which are reflected
in, yet transcend their specific laws. Dworkin argues, persuasively in
my view, that the rulebook community is "shallow" and "hollow," be-
cause it isolates citizens from one another and undermines the emo-
tional interrelationships essential to a true associational community.
93
The community of principle, in contrast, helps engender the interrela-
tional qualities needed for true bonding
2 94
Consider, too, a simpler contrast. On the one hand, living in a
rulebook community is like a series of business transactions: Bargain
for the best rules you can get, follow the rules (perhaps breaching when
efficient to do so), make your money, and move on to the next deal.
This aspiration does capture much of American life, but we are deeply
ambivalent about it.295 Even as a description of the business world, iso-
lated dealmaking seems incomplete, for it marginalizes the importance
of fostering goodwill, cooperating, and building relationships over
time.2 9 1 More importantly, only the most hard-nosed entrepreneur
would want to live her whole life by the deal approach she might use in
business. Especially for those who are not good dealmakers (often for
reasons having nothing to do with talent), the transactional ideal seems
not only empty but anti-human and alienating. In contrast, living in a
community of principle is like living in a family. Familial communities
offer their members a potentially richer life. Compete and dispute
though they may, family members are bonded together by common
goals, shared experiences, and mutual concern for the interests of
others. Any conception of community that limits itself to the transac-
tional ideal, and ignores the family ideal, neglects essential human and
societal needs.
For profound philosophical- reasons, the transactional ideal-the
rulebook community-no longer makes sense as an exclusive statement
of our political aspiration. Pluralism assumes that individuals are iso-
lated and that their preferences are independent of politics; this as-
sumption is now highly controversial. The nineteenth century liberal
293 Id. at 212.
294 "Everyone's political acts express on every occasion, in arguing about what the
rules should be as well as how they should be enforced, a deep and constant commit-
ment commanding sacrifice, not just by losers but also by the powerful who would gain
by the kind of logrolling and checkerboard solutions integrity forbids." Id. at 213.
299 Witness the popular successes of Tom Wolfe's novel BONFIRE OF THE VANI-
TIES (1987), and the movie Wall Street (1987), both of which feature protagonists
whose adherence to the dealmaking ethic both fuels their rise and dictates their ultimate
disgrace.
29I See, &g., R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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vision of individuality and politics (the key to pluralism as I am using
it here) is giving way to a vision that is founded upon an intersubjective
definition of individuality and a dialectic view of politics and interpre-
tation.29 Whereas traditional liberalism defined the individual as an
autonomous collection of exogenous preferences, we now recognize the
many ways in which such autonomy is impossible and, indeed, inhu-
man. Our individuality is not only strongly influenced by the commu-
nity in which it is situated but is dependent upon our interactions with
others. Our potential as individuals is determined through dialogue and
interchange with others. According to this view of human nature, our
preferences are inevitably shaped by our community, by our discussions
with others, and by the process by which we articulate and press our
preferences.298
In a society where individuals are defined in part by their commu-
nity interaction, politics is dialogic, and interpretation is an ongoing
process by which meaning is created and changed. Rather than simply
being the mechanism by which interest groups make deals to attain
their preexisting preferences (the pluralist view), politics is often the
organic activity through which we discover our values and implement
them in some concrete way, after discussion and accommodation (the
public values view).299 Similarly, interpretation of legal texts is not the
archeological excavation of some long-departed historical understanding
(the pluralist view), but the retrieval of meaning from the past that is
pertinent for a present-day problem (the public values view).300
This modern view of politics and society suggests that legislative
supremacy (and certainly the special use of it by the nominalists) is
only one of several fundamental precepts of our polity. Specifically, it is
subordinate, or not superior, to the precept that lawmaking is informed
by values formed through a process of public discussion. Statutory in-
297 For leading works in the area, see R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND
RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS (1983); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
29 See generally Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagina-
tion, and the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1135, 1178-96 (1988) (explicating the view that identity is formed through interaction
with one's community).
299 See Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 1, at 1548-58 (developing a theory of repub-
licanism based on dialogue, equality, universalism, and representation, as opposed to
self-serving deal-making).
200 See Cornell, supra note 298, at 1161-66 (asserting that interpreters of prece-
dent should look not for what the law "is" but for what the law "might have been,"
thus evoking meaning "out of the reinterpretation of the past"); Michelman, supra
note 6, at 1495 (noting that republican constitutionalism "involves the on-going revision
of the normative histories . . . needed to extend the political community" to those who
played no role in its past).
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terpretation, in such a community of integrity, ought not needlessly
flaunt the deliberative decisions made by the legislature (Catholic
Bishop), but does have the capacity for harmonizing statutes with
changing values and policies over time (Weber, Bob Jones). To the ex-
tent that interpretation can contribute to "law's integrity," it can aug-
ment the legitimacy of our government and contribute to our commu-
nity of principle.
B. Incoherence & Indeterminacy
As suggested by the previous Section, the case for the legitimacy of
public values interpretation in a representative democracy is strongest if
it can be demonstrated that the Court contributes to law's integrity by
using public values analysis coherently. Unhappily, I cannot make that
claim about the Court's decisions of the last ten years. Just as the old
canons of statutory construction were criticized as indeterminate (each
canon having a nullifying complement)," 1 so the public value rules ex-
amined in Part II can be seen as indeterminate: Sometimes the Court
will find them pertinent and decisive; other times the Court will not
even find them; and it is hard to predict when the Court will do either.
There is a randomness to the Court's invocation of public values which
is quite troubling and which prevents public values from contributing
as much to law's integrity as they theoretically could.
Thus for every case like Catholic Bishop, which interprets statutes
to avoid constitutional doubts, there are other cases where a statute is
construed boldly, to face substantial constitutional troubles.30 2 For every
case like Cardoza-Fonseca, which interprets statutes in light of inter-
national law and comity, there are other cases in which the Court ig-
nores or slights equally compelling international agreements.30 3 For
30 See Llewellyn, supra note 12, at 401-06.
302 For cases rejecting the Catholic Bishop approach and decided about the same
time as Catholic Bishop, see Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248-54 (1979)
(holding that authority given federal courts to approve electronic surveillance under
Title III of the Safe Streets Act includes authority to approve covert entries); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (refusing to narrow statutory prohibition of "ob-
scene, profane, or indecent" radio broadcasts to cover only the "obscene"); Federal En-
ergy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976) (interpreting President's
statutory authority to "adjust" imports threatening to impair national security to in-
clude authority to raise license fees on imported oil).
303 Compare Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104
(1988) (Hague Service Convention does not apply when a domestic subsidiary is served
as an agent of a foreign corporation) with id. at 2116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment) (Hague Convention does apply). Compare Socit6 Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (Hague Evidence
Convention provides optional but not exclusive way to obtain foreign evidence from
litigant subject to jurisdiction of U.S. court) with id. at 2561-62 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
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every case like McNally, which interprets criminal statutes restrictively,
lest defendants not have notice of the meaning of the prohibition, there
are other cases in which the Court interprets ambiguous criminal stat-
utes broadly.04 One such case is United States v. Albertini.305
Albertini was a criminal prosecution based upon a federal statute
making it unlawful to reenter a military base after having been "or-
dered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge
thereof."' ' After an incident in which he and a friend had entered an
air force base and destroyed government property, Albertini had been
issued a "bar letter" from the commanding officer, forbidding him from
reentering without written permission. Nine years later, Albertini and
some friends reentered the base during its annual open house for
Armed Forces Day. The friends engaged in a peaceful demonstration
protesting the nuclear arms race, and Albertini took pictures. For this,
he was charged with, and convicted of, violating the criminal reentry
statute.
An interpretation of the reentry statute to cover the peaceful con-
duct at an open house, nine years after the bar letter, seems to me at
war with both the rule of lenity and the meta-rule to avoid constitu-
tional (first amendment) questions. Yet a divided Court affirmed Alber-
tini's conviction. Why? This is a complicated inquiry, and its answer
suggests three systemic reasons the Court's episodic use of public values
analysis may not contribute significantly to the community of principle
that is its aspiration.
To begin with, the Justices are themselves ambivalent about the
role of public values in statutory interpretation. Because of concerns
about legitimacy (analyzed in the previous Section), many of the Jus-
tices are hesitant to invoke public values in statutory interpretation. In
1985, when Albertini was decided, at least two Justices-White and
Rehnquist-tended to be statutory nominalists," 7 and two other Jus-
ing in part) (arguing that principle of comity should be followed).
304 Compare Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988) (expanding the
definition of "material misrepresentation" constituting grounds for denaturalizing an
immigrant) with id. at 1557 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (denaturalization
statute should be narrowly construed). Compare Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public
Employment Relations Bd., 108 S. Ct. 1404 (1988) (postal monopoly statute prohibits
state university from carrying letters from union to university employees through its
internal mail system) with id. at 1413 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Private Express Stat-
utes should be narrowly construed).
305 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
300 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1982).
307 As they continue to be, on the whole. Both Justices dissented in Johnson,
Guerra, Cardoza-Fonseca, and other cases using public values analysis. See also Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2223-25 (1987) (White, J., dissenting);
School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289-93 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Both
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tices-Burger and Powell-were sometimes concerned about the legiti-
macy of public values analysis." 8 Changes in the Court's personnel
since 1985 have further undermined the Court's willingness to bend
statutes; the replacements for Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell
appear to be even more committed to statutory nominalism than (now)
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. Justice Scalia is the strong-
est voice on the Court for a narrow statutory nominalism," 9 and Jus-
tice Kennedy's early opinions have been almost as narrow and nomi-
Justices wrote important decisions eschewing a public values analysis that ought in my
view to have been pertinent. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775,
2778-82 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (reading FED. R. EVID. 104(a) literally to permit
"boot strapping" admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay without independent proof of
conspiracy); Saint Francis College v. .A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-13 (1987)
(White, J.) (allowing Arab-American to maintain racial discrimination action under
the Civil Rights Act on the curious ground that Arabs would have been considered a
distinct race in the nineteenth century). On the other hand, even these two nominalist
Justices have joined or written opinions using public values. Justice Rehnquist joined
the Court's opinions in McNally and Rose v. Rose, for example. And, somewhat sur-
prisingly, Justice White wrote three of the strongest public values opinions last Term.
See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1931, 1942-45
(1988) (White, J., dissenting) (aggressive application of meta-rule to avoid constitu-
tional issues); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1394-1404 (1988) (disapproving NLRB interpreta-
tion of statute for unnecessarily raising a serious first amendment issue); Department of
the Navy v. Egan, 108 S. Ct. 818, 827-30 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (interpreting
statute to reconcile national security interest and Navy employee's interest in full hear-
ing on discharge action).
30' Thus although Chief Justice Burger wrote such leading public values opinions
as Bob Jones and Catholic Bishop, he dissented in other leading public values opinions,
such as Weber. See also Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S.
361, 373-74 (1986) (Burger, C.J.); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
(Burger, C.J.).
During his tenure on the Court, Justice Powell was much less concerned about the
legitimacy of public values analysis, for he wrote the opinions for the Court in Midlan-
tic National Bank, Kelly, Welch, and an excellent concurring opinion in Bob Jones.
Some doubts about public values for Justice Powell might be discerned in Offshore
Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 233 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 523 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting); Watt v.
Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 62 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting); Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
10" See infra note 319. Justice Scalia dissented from the Court's public values
decision in Johnson, arguably the Court's main public values decision of the 1986
Term. He did not write a single opinion that I would characterize as inspired in signif-
icant ways by public values, though he joined the Court's opinions, without comment,
in Kelly, McNally, Rumery, and Buell. He concurred in the judgment, on narrow tex-
tual grounds, in Guerra, Cardoza-Fonseca, Rose v. Rose, and Welch. See also Citicorp
Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694, 2702 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(asserting that deciding the case did not require knowing the legislature's purpose);
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 374-76 (1987) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting
in pari materia argument and deciding that personal injury recoveries may be treated
as income in determining welfare eligibility).
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nalistic as those of Justice Scalia."' °
Thus, at least two of the Justices on the Albertini Court (and per-
haps four now) started out deeply skeptical of a public values analysis.
That alone, of course, does not explain the decision, since the other
Justices have been receptive to such analysis. The author of the opin-
ion, Justice O'Connor, has often relied on public values analysis in
both constitutional and statutory cases. 11 In fact, her opinion in Alber-
tini started with the rule that the Court should first determine whether
an interpretation of the statute is "fairly possible" by which the consti-
tutional question might be avoided. 12
Justice O'Connor found the statutory language unyielding, how-
ever. "Statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions,
but this interpretative canon is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite
language enacted by the legislature." '313 This suggests a stronger reason
for not applying the constitutional values here: the statutory text is
clear. The various public values rules and presumptions are generally
310 See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1814-19 (1988) (Kennedy,
J.) (using literal reading of statute to invalidate part of a long-standing Customs Ser-
vice regulatory scheme); Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1255, 1258-60
(1988) (Justice Kennedy's first important statutory interpretation decision, striking
down federal regulation governing cost reimbursement to hospitals as contrary to "plain
meaning" of medicare statute).
... See generally Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 592-613 (1986) (suggesting that Justice
O'Connor's position diverges from other conservatives because of a feminist perspective
that emphasizes community and civic virtue values over individual rights and pluralist
values). Justice O'Connor wrote the opinions for the Court in important public values
cases such as Utah Public Lands, Shearson/ American Express, and Wimberly. Her
concurring opinions in Rose v. Rose, Rumery, and Johnson are models of public values
analysis. See also United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2764-65 (1988)
(O'Connor, J.) (applying rule of lenity to limit slavery statute to situations involving
use or threat of physical force or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the
legal process); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666, 1676-77
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (deferring to agency
determination); Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2751-54 (1987) (O'Connor,
J.) (applying rule of lenity to construe statute regarding defrauding the United States);
Soci&t Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2557-68 (1987) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall & O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting in part) (urging more respect for Hague Evidence Convention, in the interest
of international comity); Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2528 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (seeking to preserve state regulation); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S. Ct. 2287,
2298-300 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (appealing to fairness in construing regu-
lations governing evaluation of social security disability claims); Lukhard v. Reed, 481
U.S. 368, 384-92 (1987) (Powell, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall & O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting) (rejecting regulations that treat personal injury awards as income, since un-
just and inconsistent with the basic purpose of the statute); Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 43 (1987) (O'Connor, J.) (applying purposive whole act rule and in pari
materia rule to find ERISA preemption of state common law).




subject to legislative rebuttal, and clear statutory text might be consid-
ered sufficient for this purpose. With the two statutory nominalists
(Justices White and Rehnquist) forming a core group suspicious of
public values in 1985, it only required three Justices finding the text
sufficiently clear in order to negate the public values.
Yet this reason, too, is not entirely persuasive, because the statu-
tory text does not answer the question as clearly as the Court's opinion
would suggest. While the statute is broad enough to cover Albertini, it
certainly does not target people like him, and it would be inconceivable
for courts to apply the statute as broadly as it is written. As Justice
Stevens argued in dissent, a literal reading of the statute would justify
criminal prosecution of someone, removed from the base because of
drunkenness, who returned nine years later to an open house, or even
wandered onto the base wholly by accident."1 4 These absurd conse-
quences could be avoided by reading a mens rea requirement into the
criminal statute. Although the Court was not willing to do so in Alber-
tini, in other cases the Court, "in keeping with the common-law tradi-
tion and with the general injunction that 'ambiguity concerning the am-
bit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity,' has on a
number of occasions read a state-of-mind component into an offense
even when the statutory definition did not in terms so provide.)
3 15
Indeed, the criminal statute in Albertini seems no clearer than the
bankruptcy statute whose apparent meaning was overridden in Kelly
and Midlantic National Bank, decisions written by literalist Justice
Powell. And when the legislative history is also considered, the statute
in Albertini (which had no history suggesting such a draconian applica-
tion) seems somewhat less clear than the statute in Catholic Bishop
(where equally sweeping language was backed up by quite specific
supporting legislative history), the latter decision written by literalist
Chief Justice Burger. Comparing the statute whose language was ap-
plied strictly and literally (Albertini) with those statutes applied very
leniently (Kelly, Midlantic National Bank, and Catholic Bishop), it is
hard to find relevant textual distinctions. In all four of the cases, the
statutory language is broad enough to cover the issue squarely, yet the
only case where the broad language was strictly applied is the single
case supposedly covered by the rule of lenity-Albertini. It seems un-
likely that the asserted clarity of the statutory text is what persuaded
six Justices to uphold Albertini's conviction.
314 See id. at 697-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court, quite properly, dis-
claimed any willingness to read the statute that broadly. See id. at 683-84.
35 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (quot-
ing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
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Justice O'Connor's opinion suggests a third reason the constitu-
tional values I find dispositive were not so for the Court: a competing
public value. The bulk of the Court's opinion is a balanced discussion
of the first amendment issues. Based on prior case law applying first
amendment principles to military installations, the Court concluded
that the commandant's action was not constitutionally questionable. Al-
though the commandant's action seems extreme in Albertini, the Court
believed that the judiciary must afford broad discretion to military au-
thorities who are assigned to protect our national security. Indeed, judi-
cial deference to executive decisions on national security matters might
be said to be a public value itself, for it has influenced judicial interpre-
tation of statutes in cases like Dames & Moore and in three military
affairs cases decided in the 1986 Term, the Term immediately after
Albertini. 16 The three Justices who voted against the military in all
three of those cases-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens-were
the three dissenters in Albertini. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Powell voted with the military in all three cases; Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor voted with the military in two of the three.
Their five votes, plus the vote of then-Chief Justice Burger (also quite
deferential to military discretion), furnished the majority in Albertini.
This analysis of Albertini suggests several systematic limitations
on the ability of public values interpretation to create coherence in law.
First, such analysis will not eliminate our country's overall pattern of
"checkerboard statutes,' 31 7 which treat similarly situated people differ-
ently. That is, if the statutory language clearly indicates a certain re-
sult, it is unlikely that public values will trump that result. Hence,
similarly situated people will be treated differently. This checkerboard
rule is obviously at odds with the idea of a community of principle. Yet
checkerboard statutes are quite common. Congress tends to draft stat-
utes in an ad hoc way, responding to particular events and problems;
over time, Congress tends to add on new rules and exceptions to stat-
utes (if it does anything at all) but not to make different statutes coher-
ent with one another; each statutory scheme builds upon its own tradi-
tions and even accidents. The Court is limited in its ability to reconcile
316 See United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987) (barring constitutional
tort suit for military experimentation with LSD on unwitting soldiers); Solorio v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987) (expanding military court-martial jurisdiction);
United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (no statutory tort lawsuit for soldier
killed incident to military service, even if negligence was by civilian employees).
317 See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 179 n.6 (using the word
"checkerboard" to describe statutes "that display incoherence in principle and that can




those checkerboard statutes which are detailed in their prescriptions,
because even most public values interpreters are loathe to tamper with
a clear statutory text. Indeed, one might consider the plain meaning
rule of statutory interpretation to embody a public value: Citizens
ought to be able to discern the apparent meaning of the statutes printed
in the United States Code and to rely on that understanding in organiz-
ing their affairs. 18 In most cases, therefore, public values rules will just
operate at the margins of statutory schemes.
Second, the Court's heterogeneity suggests that it is unlikely to de-
velop a consistent public values approach to statutory cases. Consider
the current Court, which can be divided into three groups of Justices.
One group (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White, and
[probably] Kennedy) is fairly nominalistic. 19 These Justices are
strongly committed to pluralism as a political philosophy and, hence,
s ' The nominalist Justices do not state this argument for emphasizing the plain
meaning of statutes over other values, but it may be an important assumption. See
Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1986) (Bur-
ger, C.J.) (rejecting appeal to purpose or policy of statute where the language was clear
in defining "bank"); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. 458 U.S. 564, 574-77 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J.) (rejecting argument that statute should not be read literally to produce
damages disproportionate to injury to seaman denied wages); United Air Lines v. Mc-
Mann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977) (Burger, C.J.) (relying on ordinary definition of
"subterfuge" to confirm Congressional intent that mandatory retirement before age 65
is permitted if pursuant to long-established pension plan).
319 Justice Scalia, in particular, has a well-developed theory of statutory nominal-
ism (emphasizing process values and focusing on statutory text) that stands as an alter-
native to a public values approach. The best expressions of his underlying theory may
be found in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657-77 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing literal reading of text and original intent of legislature, and
therefore reading Title VII of Civil Rights Act to require color-blind hiring and to
prohibit affirmative action plans), and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (clear language in statute should be
conclusive without need to consult legislative history). See also United States v. John-
son, 481 U.S. at 692-703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dangers of judicial creativity, as stat-
ute evolves further away from textual meaning); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 640-41
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (narrow textual grounds for joining the
Court's purposivist result); California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 481 U.S.
572, 607-14 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (administration of state land should always
be characterized as land use regulation, regardless of standards applied); Lukhard v.
Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 374-76 (1987) (Scalia, J.) (holding that Virginia's treatment of
personal injury awards as income in determining AFDC eligibility was not inconsistent
with the AFDC statute); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
295-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting purpose analysis and
arguing that Court should rely on narrowest possible grounds in holding state anti-
pregnancy-discrimination statute not preempted by federal law). For cases illustrating
the nominalist views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, see supra note 307;
on Justice Kennedy, see supra note 310. Cf Denvir, Justice Brennan, Justice Rehn-
quist, and Free Speech, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 285, 292-99 (1985) (noting Justice Rehn-
quist's emphasis on majoritarian, efficiency, and process values in first amendment
cases).
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are most sensitive to the countermajoritarian difficulty and charges of
judicial lawmaking. They will apply the meta-rules, presumptions, and
clear statement rules discussed in this Article, to the extent that other
signals from the legislature (text and/or legislative history) are not dis-
positive. Consistent with a thoroughgoing pluralism, the public values
most appealing to the nominalistic Justices are process values in which
courts defer to other decisionmakers-state governments, federal agen-
cies and the executive branch, and private arbitrators.
A second group (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and [to some extent]
Blackmun) is substantially committed to the republican tradition in
which public values pervasively affect statutory interpretation.320 The
republican Justices are more committed to the Brown experience than
they are to a thoroughgoing political pluralism, and their sensitivity to
the countermajoritarian difficulty is often balanced by a sensitivity to
the systemic flaws in the political process-exclusion of minority
groups, inertia, and statutory obsolescence. 2 They will aggressively
apply most of the meta-rules, presumptions, and clear statement rules,
often trumping apparent legislative signals (albeit not necessarily
"clear" signals). Republican Justices differ markedly from nominalist
Justices in the priority and harmonization precepts they follow when
public values are in conflict (as in Albertini). For example, the republi-
can Justices have less enthusiasm for process values than do the nomi-
nalist Justices and are more likely to follow substantive policy values in
cases of conflict (the injustice of jailing Albertini outweighs deference to
320 These Justices wrote most of the leading public values decisions discussed in
this Article-Johnson, Weber, Guerra, Mancera, Rose v. Rose, Wells Fargo, Arline,
LaPlante-and voted together not only in these cases, but also tended to dissent to-
gether in cases where the Court arguably ignored or slighted important public values.
For recent examples, see Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (1988) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2519 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct.
2104, 2112 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Morgan, 108 S.
Ct. 1837, 1896 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372, 1384 (1988) (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Welch v. State Dep't of Highways
& Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2958 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bourjaily v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2784 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Tanner v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2754 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Soci~tE Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2557 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2346 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S. Ct.
2287, 2300 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In all but Monessen and K Mart, all
three Justices voted together, and usually were joined by no other Justice.
32 Cf Denvir, supra note 319, at 299-306 (noting Justice Brennan's willingness




A third group (Justices Stevens and O'Connor) might be associ-
ated with the pragmatic tradition, in which the statutory interpreter is
sensitive to both pluralist and republican concerns, to both legislative
supremacy and just results, and to both the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty and the Brown legacy. 22 Like the republican Justices, the prag-
matic Justices will follow the full range of meta-rules, presumptions,
and clear statement rules but will stop short of displacing clear statu-
tory text and history with a judicially derived value. Like the nominal-
ist Justices, the pragmatic Justices are deferential to more majoritarian
decisionmakers, but are also more willing to bend those decisions to
reflect public values. The pragmatic Justices tend to write narrower,
fact-based opinions, and their voting is a bit ad hoc, because the facts of
individual cases will make more of a difference to them.
In short, the role of public values in the Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation is going to vary from case to case, depending upon how
persuasive an argument the nominalist and republican Justices will be
able to make, and how the pragmatic Justices behave. This phenome-
non, moreover, is not limited to the current Court, for most of the
Courts in this century have shown fragmentation on issues arising out
of different political assumptions. Because Justices often remain on the
Court for long periods of time, and because appointments reflect (how-
ever imperfectly) changing political tastes, the Court at any one time is
322 Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined almost all of the public values decisions
discussed in this article, with the notable exception of McNally, where they dissented
on practical grounds. Like the republican Justices, Justices Stevens and O'Connor sup-
port the evolution of civil rights statutes, as in Johnson, Guerra, and Bob Jones. Like
the nominalist Justices, Justices Stevens and O'Connor will adhere to relatively clear
statutory texts and/or legislative history, over the objections of the republican Justices,
as in Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414, 425 (1988) (Stevens, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting); Volkswagenwerk Aktien-
gesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988) (O'Connor, J.); Bourjaily v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.);
Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987) (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concur-
ring); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (Stevens,
J., joined by O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
While they are both pragmatic, Justices Stevens and O'Connor are very different
pragmatists. Justice Stevens is more willing to bend apparently clear statutory texts in
response to public values, and is more skeptical of status quo values than is Justice
O'Connor. Contrast Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Albertini with Justice
Stevens' dissent. For other opinions that illustrate their differences in this area, see
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 108 S. Ct. 1404 (1988);
Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 399
(1987). In each case, Justice O'Connor was in the majority, and Justice Stevens was in
dissent.
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likely to reflect a variety of political viewpoints. 2 Hence, it is not sur-
prising to see disagreement about the proper role of public values in
statutory interpretation.
Third, and most important, public values analysis is beset by
problems of definition and harmonization. What is a public value?
How should it be weighed? What if it conflicts with another public
value? Neither the Court nor commentators have worked out rules for
harmonizing competing public values, 24 and the most that I can say is
to expand upon the gravitational metaphor suggested earlier: Public
values will be most important in cases where the statutory text and/or
legislative history are ambiguous or, especially, deliberately open-tex-
tured (for even statutory nominalists must fill in vague statutes with
something). They will be less often influential when the statutory text
is clear, especially if the plain meaning is buttressed by legislative his-
tory. Constitutional values will have greater weight than statutory or
common law values. There is further variation even within these cate-
gories, since some constitutional values (free speech and protection of
Carolene groups) count more than others (deference to state decision-
making). The extent to which a public value is implicated in a case also
makes a difference.
Under this analysis, Albertini rests upon a complex weighing of
values by the Court. Given the perceived clarity of the text, the Court
started with a presumption in favor of that meaning, thereby negating
the rule to avoid constitutional questions. The Court did not consider
free speech or fairness values strongly implicated in the case, because
the defendant was put on notice by the bar letter and because his prose-
cution arguably was not precipitated by his picture-taking. To the ex-
tent that such values were implicated, they were offset by the constitu-
tional value of military discretion in national security matters. The
public values, for the Court, were too beclouded to rebut the presump-
tive plain meaning of the statute. This is what I believe the Court was
doing in Albertini. I think it's crazy.
323 The current Court consists of three Justices appointed by conservative Presi-
dent Reagan, one by moderate President Ford, two by moderate President Nixon, one
by liberal President Johnson, one by liberal President Kennedy, and one by moderate
President Eisenhower. While the Justices do not necessarily reflect the ideology of the
President appointing them, the variations often have a way of balancing out. Liberal
Justice Brennan was appointed by Eisenhower, while moderately conservative Justice
White was appointed by Kennedy, for example.
324 C. Sunstein, supra note 9, makes some tentative suggestions that the presump-
tion of decisions by politically accountable actors should occupy highest priority, fol-
lowed by Constitution-based rules, followed by presumptions in favor of coordination
and against statutory obsolescence.
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C. Arbitrariness & Elitism
Albertini is no isolated example of what I consider to be an in-
defensible weighing of public values. The rule of lenity cases, in partic-
ular, strike me as capricious. The constitutional value of sufficient no-
tice to the defendant that she is breaking the law seems ill-served by the
Court's rather random invocation of the rule. Hence, the rule of lenity
was not invoked in Albertini, where the conduct posed no threat to the
statutory goals and was at best malum prohibitum, while the rule was
invoked in McNally, where the conduct (bribery and corruption) was
malum in se and had been found criminal by a long line of circuit court
decisions.325 Several cases last Term continue the Court's bizarre use of
the rule of lenity.3"'
Other cases discussed in Part II are equally vulnerable to the ob-
jection that the Court weights public values in an arbitrary and in-
defensible way. For example, Shearson lAmerican Express subordi-
nated the securities law anti-fraud policy to the arbitration policy. This
is questionable since the former policy was supported by precedent, sig-
nals of congressional approval of the specific application of the prece-
dent to the situation in question, and the demonstrated inefficacy of
arbitration as a remedy for consumers who lack an equal footing with
investment advisers. 27 Rumery's application of common law contract
waiver policies in a situation of inherently unequal bargaining power
strikes me indefensible, especially given our longstanding presumption
against waiver of constitutional rights. In fact, several cases decided in
the 1987 Term strike me as questionable weighings of competing pub-
lic values.328
These cases suggest that the greatest danger of public values anal-
ysis in statutory interpretation is that it will be decisively influenced by
32 See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2884-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
328 Compare United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (1988) (rule of
lenity protects psychological coercion of retarded laborers from reach of involuntary
servitude statute) with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd.,
108 S. Ct. 1404, 1410 (1988) (rule of lenity does not protect university mail system
from ambiguous postal monopoly prohibition).
327 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2346-58
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
328 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2519-28
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court's federal common law tort immu-
nity for defense contractors, in part because Congress has decided not to supersede state
law in this area); Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837, 1843-44 (1988)
(common law gapfilling rule trumps purpose of statute); Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S.
Ct. 1372, 1381-83 (1988) (presumption against implied repeals trumps statutory an-
tidiscrimination policies); United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668, 675-77 (1988) (pur-
pose of statute precluding judicial review overcomes presumptions of judicial review
and against implied repeals).
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the political preferences of the Justices, who are subject to biases that
are hard to defend in a modern democracy.32 Most public values schol-
ars do not argue that judges will always make the right political
choices. Rather, they argue that judges are constrained in ways that
make good choices more likely. As Owen Fiss puts it, "[t]he judge is
entitled to exercise power only after he has participated in a dialogue
about the meaning of the public values. It is a dialogue with very spe-
cial qualities," 3 ' for judges do not control their agenda and must inter-
pret statutes critical to cases before them, are bound to listen to a multi-
plicity of viewpoints, and must respond to these viewpoints with a
reasoned justification for their resolution of the case. 31 A related con-
straint is imposed by the audience for judicial decisions that interpret
statutes-what literary theorists, and now law professors, call the "in-
terpretive community. '  That is, the expectations of legislators, aca-
demics, other judges, and the parties themselves constrain the political
choices made by judges, and compel judges to justify their choices by
reference to something more than fiat or personal preference.
I think that there is much to this response. The very process of
public values interpretation at least ventilates policy issues in an open
intellectual forum. This airing often does advance the coherence and
rationality of the statutes being interpreted. Even in Albertini, where I
disagree with the Court's balance, the Court's opinion is no worse than
the statute (which is woefully broad; dicta in the Court's opinion sug-
gest situations where the statute's broad language must not be applied)
and is a reasoned explanation for the defendant's punishment. None-
theless, in a good many of the Court's decisions in the 1980s, the dia-
logue of interpretation is more a cosmetic than a real limitation upon
the Court, because the Justices' political biases run so deep. I discern
three types of deep bias in the Court's opinions of the 1980s that I find
unjustifiable.33
32' See Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 770-73 (1982);
Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 1, at 16.
3 Fiss, supra note 1, at 13.
331 See Eskridge, supra note 33, at 303-06 (similar argument from the perspective
of economic theory); see also S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL
REASONING (1985).
"' See Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 183 (1985); Fiss, Objec-
tivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744-45 (1982).
"' Cf Brest, supra note 329, at 770-73 (arguing that the fact that the interpreta-
tive legal community, the courts, are demographically composed of the ruling elite
presents problems in a democratic society).
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1. Bias for Procedural over Substantive Values
The current Court is more. willing to defer to other deci-
sionmakers-state courts (Kelly) and prosecutors (Rumery), the Presi-
dent (Dames & Moore), the military (Albertini), agencies (Arline), ar-
bitrators (Shearson lAmerican Express)-than to take substantive
positions of its own.33 4 This bias is, in part, a reflection of the divisions
within the Court. Because of their commitment to political pluralism,
the statutory nominalists on the Court are usually all too happy to ap-
ply rules and presumptions under which the Court defers to other deci-
sionmakers to guide the nation's public values. Conversely, they are
usually reluctant, even outraged, when the Court itself takes a leader-
ship role-as it has on issues of racial and gender discrimination, treat-
ment of noncitizens, criminal punishment, employees' rights, and Na-
tive American sovereignty. For the Court to take a strong substantive
position on an issue of statutory interpretation, there must be virtual
unanimity among the remaining Justices as to the content of the public
value, for the loss of one or two votes can mean the loss of a majority.
This result is not unusual, since Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
O'Connor each have certain conservative value preferences.
The willingness of the Court, and especially its statutory nominal-
ists, to follow rules of deference is also strongly influenced by the legal
process philosophy and its emphasis on the value of regularized proce-
dures in yielding good decisions.335 Like individualism, the value of
elaborate procedures is an increasingly controversial assumption. Al-
though encouraging deliberative decisionmaking at several points in the
political system may improve the quality of decisions, diffusion often
distorts policymaking as well by amplifying the tendency of political
decisionmakers to develop endogenous values more responsive to con-
stituency groups than to the public interest." 6 When the result of delib-
erative decisionmaking is wrong, is it entitled to deference just because
the procedures were regularized?
3'1 Concededly, the procedural deference may often reflect a substantive value
choice as well. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing Dames &
Moore); supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (discussing Arline).
s31 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at 694-701 (1987); Parker, The Past
of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 223, 224-32 (1981); G.
Peller, supra note 21.
"' See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue
Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1581-82 (1988) (discuss-
ing the disproportionate influence that special interest groups wield because of individ-
ual legislators' tendencies to work only for their districts' interests and their lack of
incentive to work for the good of the public at large); see also Eskridge, supra note 33,
at 285-89 (discussing the distorting influence of interest groups on political deci-
sionmakers' putative goal of making laws that provide "public goods").
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Albertini illustrates my quarrel with the Court's proceduralist ori-
entation. Although I believe that the substantive values implicated in
the case-freedom of expression, fairness, and notice to the wrong-
doer-strongly support a narrowing interpretation of the statute, the
Court apparently believed that courts would do more harm than good if
they opened the door to questions about individual judgments made by
military commandants. I find this view to be a thoroughly counterintui-
tive proposition, especially given the circumstances of Albertini's arrest
(which smacks of spite rather than judgment). Yet the Court seems
committed to that hands-off principle, however questionable its wisdom
or unjust the results it may spawn in certain cases. A number of the
decisions in the last two Terms similarly reflect the Court's excessive
deference to military and other executive decisionmakers.
37
2. Bias for Obsolescent Values
The military discretion cases suggest a second type of systematic
bias in the Court's public values decisions: By the time the Court forms
a consensus about a public value, the value may be obsolete, and the
Court may cling to established public values long after their cogency
has passed. Hence, there may be a bias in the Court's decisions in favor
of traditional, time-tested values, and some reluctance on the part of the
Court to expand the nation's public values, or update them to reflect
important changes in society and moral theory. Perhaps deference to
military discretion was high-minded and right before Vietnam, but our
experience in that "war" and in the 1970s ought to make us skeptical
of the military's claims for unreviewable decisionmaking power.
The sovereign immunity cases also illustrate this bias. Sovereign
immunity has a longstanding common law pedigree, but in modern
times the principle has been questioned and usually rejected in cases
where the government enters the marketplace and/or commits a tort.3
... The worst in my view was United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987), in
which the Court held that military officials are immune from suits alleging that they
intentionally tested LSD on unwitting, unconsenting military personnel. It is shocking
that the Court would defer to the military in an instance in which its conduct was "so
far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot be
considered a part of the military mission." Id. at 3065 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). For other (less outrageous) examples, see San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) (up-
holding USOC monopoly on "Olympics" terminology); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S. Ct.
2287 (1987) (upholding HHS regulations creating stricter standards for disability
claimants); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (utilizing a broad applica-
tion of judicially created exception to FTCA for injuries to people in the armed
services).
338 See, e.g., Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210
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Some of the Court's opinions reflect this modern concept of immunity,
but many do not. The presumption of state immunity embodied in
Welch (which in fact overruled a prior opinion) seems awkward and
out-of-date. And the Court has in the 1980s given the FTCA an ex-
ceedingly narrow reading, reflecting an unfair willingness to perpetuate
the common law immunity doctrine. 3 9
Even where I support the Court's public values, I am troubled by
doubts that the Court has thought through the implications of its deci-
sions carefully. For example, the Court's validation of employment
preferences in Johnson v. Transportation Agency34 was phrased in
terms much broader than necessary to decide the case. 4 ' This boldness
is troubling, because Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion suggested sev-
eral fairness problems with the Court's public value. Employers having
racial or gender disparities in their workforce face potential Title VII
liability, under the Court's precedents. The costs of such liabil-
ity-probable judgment plus defense costs-can be avoided through af-
firmative action programs, which will shift the cost of past discrimina-
tion, or the appearance of it, from the employer to employees (many of
whom had no role in the past discrimination). "This situation is more
likely to obtain, of course, with respect to the least skilled
jobs-perversely creating an incentive to discriminate against precisely
those members of the nonfavored groups least likely to have profited
from societal discrimination in the past."3 42 The result may be to trans-
form Title VII into a powerful instrument for compelling employers to
make choices based upon race and sex, which seems anomalous.
(1977) (abrogating governmental immunity for torts, contingent on no legislative activ-
ity); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795
(1962) (prospectively overruling sovereign tort immunity doctrine as "archaic").
"I See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (utilizing a broad
reading of the Feres doctrine in denying a wrongful death claim brought by the widow
of a deceased coast guard pilot); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (applying
the implied FTCA exception for military-service-related deaths to make the govern-
ment immune even for the wrongful death of a soldier killed off-base and off-duty);
Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984) (extending the FTCA exception for prop-
erty losses caused by customs officials to make the government immune even for cus-
toms officials' negligent handling of property; the traditional reading had limited the
exception to damages caused by detention of property).
340 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
341 See id. at 648 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he Court has
chosen to follow an expansive and ill-defined approach to voluntary affirmative action
by public employers .... [This] course of action gives insufficient guidance to courts
and litigants . . . ."); id. at 666 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The] decision ... disregards
the limitations carefully expressed in last Term's opinions .... While those limitations
were dicta, it is remarkable to see them so readily .. .swept away." (citations
omitted)).
141 Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, Justice Scalia argued, the powerful elite groups in this
country are perfectly happy with this transformation of Title VII. The
corporate and governmental employers filing amicus briefs in Johnson
argued for affirmative action, because it makes their decisions more
predictable and permits them to head off potential Title VII lawsuits
by dramatic improvement in their statistics. Well-organized civil rights
groups support it because it helps them win points for their immediate
agenda. Congress, which has done nothing but avoid saying anything
controversial about affirmative action for twenty-five years, is delighted
that the Court has taken the heat off of it. "In fact," Justice Scalia
sarcastically concluded, the "losers" in this process are blue-collar
white males, like Paul Johnson and Brian Weber. "The irony is that
these individuals-predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorgan-
ized-suffer this injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself
the champion of the politically impotent.
3 43
3. Bias for Establishment Values
Justice Scalia's sarcastic observation pinpoints my greatest qualm
about the Court's application of public values-the "haves" tend to
come out ahead. 44 That is, the winners in these cases tend to be the
same well-organized political groups that are winners in the political
arena: the military (Albertini and Dames & Moore); state prosecutors
(Kelly and Rumery); organized minority groups (Weber, Guerra, John-
son, Bob Jones, and Mancari); environmentalists (Midlantic National
Bank); and mainstream religious organizations (Catholic Bishop). Con-
versely, the losers in these cases tend to be losers in politics generally:
war protesters (Albertini), victims of prosecutorial discretion (Rumery)
and securities fraud (Shearson lAmerican Express), marginalized reli-
gious groups (Bob Jones), and blue collar white males denied job op-
portunities due to affirmative preferences for other groups (Weber,
Johnson, and Marcari).
In an appendix to this Article, I have assembled the public values
cases for the 1986 and 1987 Terms and have characterized the winning
and losing groups (as best I can). This appendix is a slightly more
systematic effort to show how political losers tend also to lose public
values cases, though they are not without their victories. What struck
me most profoundly as I was compiling the appendix was how often I
343 Id. at 677.
344 Cf Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 149 (1974) (arguing that "the architecture
of the legal system tends to confer interlocking advantages" on the "haves").
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characterized the losers of public values cases as "victims"-the diffuse,
faceless, often powerless periphery of our political community. The dia-
logue of public values is dominated by the voices of establishment
groups, and the marginalized groups in our polity are too often silent
or overwhelmed.
One of the marginalized groups in our society is the poor, and
they have received little protection from the Court's public values in the
1980s. Characteristic of the Court's approach is Sorenson v. Secretary
of the Treasury. 45 The case involved the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1981 (OBRA), 8" which among thousands of other things
added provisions to the Social Security Act and the Internal Revenue
Code to provide for "interception" of tax refunds for the benefit of state
agencies that had been assigned child-support rights. Thus, when a
taxpayer is in arrears for his or her child support payments, and when
the former spouse assigns them to a state welfare agency as a condition
for receiving public assistance, the state can notify the IRS, which will
then give the state's recoupment claim priority over the delinquent tax-
payer's claims for refund of overpaid federal income taxes. The issue in
Sorenson was whether the "overpayment" that is subject to the recoup-
ment claim includes refunds resulting from an "earned income credit."
Section 6402(c), added by OBRA, provides that "any overpayment to
be refunded ... shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due sup-
port. '347 Section 6401(b), already in the Internal Revenue Code when
OBRA was enacted, provides that if an earned income credit exceeds
the taxpayer's tax liability, the excess amount is "considered an over-
payment."' 48 Putting these provisions together, literally, the Court held
that the recoupment does include the credit. 49
This reading is logical but neglects an important public value, as
Justice Stevens argued in dissent.35 The Earned Income Credit Pro-
gram was created by Congress in 1975 to help keep low-income people
off welfare. It was the result of the following conundrum: Social Secur-
ity taxes were assessed against earned income but not against welfare
payments. As a result, a dollar of welfare meant more money in the
475 U.S. 851 (1986).
346 Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2331, 95 Stat. 357, 860.
3 26 U.S.C. § 6402(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
348 Id. § 6401(b).
"19 See Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 860.
*50 See id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The question is whether Congress in
1981 intended to divert these federal funds from the original beneficiaries of the Earned
Income Credit Program to the treasuries of state governments. Notwithstanding the
Court's careful and admittedly accurate parsing of the language of the statute, I am not
persuaded that Congress had any such intent.").
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pocket than a dollar of earned income. To redress this disincentive to
work, Congress created a fully refundable credit for low-income work-
ers. Applying the OBRA recoupment scheme-one of the obscure good-
ies doled out to the states in the 1981 statute-to penalize low-income
families, is, as Justice Stevens persuasively argued, neither rational nor
fair. Nor does it even reflect any legislative desire. OBRA had sprinted
through the legislative process, with scarcely any time for the hurried
drafters to catch their breath, much less think through all the
changes. 51 If any interpretational issue cried out for public values
analysis, it was the question in Sorenson.
Sorenson is paradigmatic of my criticisms of public values analysis
as applied by the Supreme Court in the 1980s. Its result seems not only
unjust but also contrary to overall legislative goals. Yet the same court
that applied fatuous public values in McNally (to protect fraudulent
state officials) and Albertini (to protect the discretion of a vindictive
commandant) refused to apply public values to protect the working
poor in Sorenson. On the face of it, the Court's utilization of public
values is incoherent. But not simply incoherent, because it is incoherent
for disturbing reasons: excessive reliance on statutory text (whose
breadth was apparently a mistake), reluctance to create new substantive
values to reflect new thinking about justice (such as the need to protect
and encourage poor people who are trying to find useful livelihoods),
and insensitivity to the claims of particularly marginalized groups.
There are many reasons for this phenomenon. Some of them prob-
ably relate to the ideology and background of the Justices themselves.
Those strongly committed to pluralism and especially those committed
to textual formalism are not going to bend the statutory text in Soren-
son. Nor is it likely that five Justices would have bent even a more
malleable text. Can we really expect people who are overeducated and
predominantly wealthy, socially conservative, European, and male to
lead us in the articulation of our diverse nation's public values? That
might ultimately be too much to ask of any such relatively homogene-
ous group.
Other reasons for the Court's insensitivity relate to the litigants
and the posture of the cases coming before the Court. The most success-
ful litigants tend to be the "repeat players"-the government, corpora-
tions, and well-funded interest groups.3 2 These repeat players are in a
351 See id. at 867 (" '[I]t defies belief' to assume that a substantial number of
legislators were sufficiently familiar with OBRA to realize that somewhere in that vast
piece of hurriedly enacted legislation there was a provision that changed the 6-year-old
Earned Income Credit Program.").
"" See Galanter, supra note 344, at 97-107 (contrasting "repeat players" with
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position to hire the best lawyers, to uncover facts or create statistics that
put their case in a favorable posture, to make sophisticated strategic
decisions about what cases are likely to make good law for them, and to
attract good allies (amicus briefs).353 Just as they have few resources
and little clout in the political process, so too the working poor have
few resources and little clout in the court system. Ergo, results like
Sorenson.
CONCLUSION
My analysis of the Court's use of public values in statutory inter-
pretation in the last decade leads to a paradox: The Court seems to rely
on public values analysis in a broad range of cases, yet the Court in
other cases neglects public values analysis or relies on values that are
hard to defend. There are several possible implications of this paradox.
Critics can argue from this analysis that public values reasoning is
basically a dead end, an example of "contemporary legal utopian-
ism." 54 That is, public values analysis is logically or practically inco-
herent, promising principles grounded in the common good but deliver-
ing policies suited to the judiciary. This incoherence is not simply the
result of conservative judicial appointments and clear statutory texts, it
might be argued, but is inherent in the enterprise. To succeed, public
values analysis (and the republican tradition generally) presumes
greater public dialogue and politico-social consensus than we now have.
Without such a tradition, public values analysis is severely limited in
its ability to contribute effectively to law's integrity.
Worse yet, from a critical perspective, is the self-deluding quality
of public values analysis. If it is true that our polity is driven by plural-
ist, interest group pressures, and that those pressures drive judicial law-
making as much as legislative lawmaking, then public values analysis is
the mere image of republicanism. It may be (as Mark Tushnet has
recently argued) that we cannot easily recreate the social and political
conditions necessary for a republican dialogue and that we should be
reluctant to vest that dialogue in socially and ethnically homogenous
jurists who are as politically and socially conservative as they are
unelected."' 5 If public values analysis is only a screen for judicial power
"one-shotters").
353 For example, the quintessential repeat player before the Supreme Court is the
Solicitor General, who represents the federal government and effectively serves as a
"tenth Justice." See L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE (1987).
"" This is a position eloquently argued by Professor Mark Tushnet. See M.
TUSHNE:r, supra note 2, at 162-68.
355 See id. at 1-17 (arguing the need to revive the republican tradition but empha-
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politics, it is worse than impotent. It is hypocritical. Whatever norma-
tive problems one might have with unadulterated pluralism, an honest
pluralism might be a better aspiration for our polity than a hypocritical
republicanism-one that pretends to integrate our nation's interests but
in reality just imposes upon us the politics of unelected judges.
Defenders of public values analysis can argue that the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have never given public values analysis much of a
chance (outside of civil rights and a few other areas of law), because the
Justices have not committed themselves to the intellectual prerequisites
of doing public values analysis. Any group of Justices that includes
three or perhaps four statutory nominalists is going to have great diffi-
culty doing public values analysis in a satisfactory way. Unless the
Court, or a consistent majority of its members, transforms the vision it
has of its mission, the Court will not do justice to public values in
statutory interpretation. In my view, the Court would have to change
its direction in three significant ways if it really took seriously the con-
cept of public values in statutory interpretation.
First, the Court ought to complement rather than replicate the po-
litical process. Even legal process theory concedes that the Court might
well intervene to protect politically marginalized groups,356 but the sta-
tus quo orientation of legal process theory has submerged this insight.
The political process already listens to the Department of Justice,
mainline churches, trade associations, unions, and other organized
groups. Often their deals harm those who truly are left out of the polit-
ical process-the poor, victims of government abuses, political refugees,
working mothers, gays, migrant workers, blue collar workers, ghetto
residents, minor ethnic groups. The Court's historical role of protecting
marginalized minorities needs to be updated to include a broader range
of people for whom justice will not be done in the political process. 5
Only then might the equality of citizens needed for law's integrity be
realized.
Second, the Court ought to be more critical of the existing
hodgepodge of public value rules and presumptions. Many of the rules
sizing the socio-political difficulties in so doing); id. at 313-14 (decentralization of
power and redistribution of wealth are prerequisites to the creation of a republican
society).
358 See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
64-65 (1980) (identifying such groups as "aberrant political groups and persons ac-
cused of crime, but also individuals in certain economic positions (racial groups being
added by later events)"); J. ELY, supra note 263, at 135-79 (advocating a "process-
oriented system of review" in order to facilitate the representation of minorities).
... See Ackerman, supra note 94, at 742 (urging the judiciary to refocus its pro-
tective efforts from "discrete and insular minorities" to "other groups who fail to
achieve influence remotely proportionate to their numbers").
[Vol. 137:1007
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
and presumptions noted in this Article are outdated and should be re-
formulated to reflect modern needs. 8' For example, the rule against
waivers of sovereign immunity should be rethought for this era when
the government is our nation's leading contractor and tortfeasor and
property owner. Moreover, new rules should be devised. Sorenson's er-
ror suggests the need for a rule like that of the Carolene group of cases:
The Court should resolve legitimate statutory doubts in favor of groups
essentially left out of the legislative process. Sorenson also suggests a
procedural rule: The Court can correct apparent legislative drafting er-
rors, and should not impute unreasonable results to Congress when it
appears Congress did not focus on those results. Finally, the Court
needs to consider more carefully how to deal with competing public
values. For example, I think fundamental substantive values-such as
nondiscrimination, first amendment concerns, and environmental pol-
icy-should prevail over procedural values-such as executive discre-
tion, federalism, and arbitration. Accepting this position would rep-
resent a major shift in the Court's approach to statutory interpretation.
Third, the Court ought to see itself as a counterhegemonic force,
rather than as a rubber stamp for the political branches of government
and for centers of private power. It may be, as Bob Cover taught us,
that courts are inherently "jurispathic" (they kill "law" by choosing
one side's vision of law over that of another) and that "jurisgenesis"
(the creation of law) occurs best outside of government. 59 If that is
necessarily so, then the critics are substantially right and public values
may contribute to law's hypocrisy rather than law's integrity. But even
Cover thought the Court could be jurisgenerative by serving as an out-
spoken critic of government, rather than as its deferential
handservant. 60
Public values in statutory interpretation may indeed be just "con-
temporary legal utopianism,"' 61 but it does not ask so much of the judi-
ciary as its critics think. The most interesting exemplars of public val-
ues reasoning on the present Court, Justices Stevens and O'Connor, are
hardly radicals and are substantially committed to the pluralist tradi-
358 The beginnings for this task are suggested in W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY,
supra note 29; C. Sunstein, supra note 9.
359 Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40-44 (1983) ("Courts, at least the courts of the state, are charac-
teristically 'jurispathic.' "); id. at 11 & n.30 ("the creation of legal mean-
ing-'jurisgenesis'-takes place always through an essentially cultural medium" and
"requires no state").
580 See id. at 57-58 ("When they oppose the violence and coercion of the other
organs of the state, judges begin to look more like the other jurisgenerative communities
of the world.").
361 M. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 168.
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tion. Yet Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca, his
concurring opinions in Johnson and Guerra, and his dissenting opin-
ions in McNally, Albertini, and Sorenson are models of the analytic
power of candid public values analysis in their attentiveness to
marginalized groups, fine awareness of the dynamic nature of public
values analysis, and willingness to confront social and political power.
Coming from a more conservative tradition, Justice O'Connor's opin-
ions in Albertini and Shearson /American Express rest upon public
values (or a weighing of different values) I find questionable. Nonethe-
less, I find her opinions in these cases candid and instructive, and her
concurring opinions in such cases as Rose v. Rose, Rumery, and John-
son strike me as excellent and persuasive expositions of public values.
Inspired by the work of Justices Stevens and O'Connor,
pragmatists can argue from the analysis of this Article that public val-
ues reasoning is not going to generate a grand change in the way the
Supreme Court decides cases. And to the extent public values are being
used by the Court, they will not be used consistently or decisively.
Nonetheless, the pragmatist can note that public values reasoning sub-
stantially contributed to law's integrity in certain areas of law-civil
rights statutes, the securities laws, immigration law, antitrust law, and
statutes affecting Native Americans. More important, by exposing
background policy presumptions and understandings, public values
analysis sharpens the policy issues at stake in statutory interpretation
cases. No less than in constitutional cases, the Court is engaged in crea-
tive analysis, with political consequences. The candid exploration of
these background understandings in the context of concrete cases is
characteristic of the opinions of Justices Stevens and O'Connor.
Ultimately, the fate of public values in statutory interpretation
may rest with these pragmatic Justices. In practical application, public
values analysis may lose much of its utopian romance but may gain
concreteness grounded in practical reason. This is the path I see for
public values in statutory interpretation-neither law's republic nor
law's hypocrisy, but instead "law's pragmatism." '362
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